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Abstract
'!his dissertation provides an empirical analysis of the
theol:Y of regulatory capture. Distinction is made between simpler
perceptions of the occurrence of regulation, and the theory of
regulation presented by sam Peltzrnan. rrhe basic Peltzman thesis is
that regulation is detennined by a rational political support max-
imizing legislator. '!he focus of this study is on investigating the
accuracy of Peltzman' s theory. 'Ib date, there does not exist a
good enpirical rrodel of regulatol:Y capture which can be used to
test this theory in a broad array of case settings. A principal
feature of this dissertation is the developn::mt of such a general
mx1el.
'!his nodel is then applied to two case settings. rrhe appli-
cations serve two purposes: l) to reexamine the evidence fran two
earlier studies which supported the si.rcpler view of regulatory cap-
ture, and 2) to test the perfonnance of the Peltzman theory, both
in an absolute sense, and relative to the si.rcpler theories.
'!he analysis generally supports the position that the Peltznan
theory nore accurately predicts the presence or absence of regulation
over a professim than the sinpler theory. several variables tested,
in particular those suggesting conditions under which the rational
legislator will support the public's interest as opposed to that of
the profession, are found to be significant.
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A.) .. Introduction
The "capture theory" of regulation is one of several
theories which atterrpt to explain the existence and format of
regulation presently affecting nunerous occupations/industries.
In the broadest of tenns, it proposes that the regulations
over occupational groups (or finns within various industries)
are designed in such a way that the benefits of regulation go
to the group being regulated. Several studies (to be examined
belav) have looked at the :i.Irpact of regulation on important
market variables such as price, incane, and profits, but at
present the evidence concerning the capture theory is unclear.
In part this is because of the lack of claritv in the
definition of "regulatory capture." The meaning of this tenn
has taken on various subtle changes over the last two decades.
As a result, one m:xiest goal of the present work is to clarify
the meaning of the tenn "capture." This will be done, in the
follaving sections of this chapter, by describing the evolution
of the tenn through its various stages of sophistication.
Studies involving what has by convention been called the
"capture hypothesis" will be the first to be reexamined. The
weaknesses of this naive nodel of regulation will then be high-
lighted. This will be follaved by an examination of the "pred-
atory capture theory" and a discussion of its limitations.
Finally, the ITOst recent developnent in the "capture theory,"
work done by Sam Peltzman, will be explored. The Peltzman work,
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it will be argued, develops the richest theoretical nodel
of regulation to date. Yet, there is limited empirical
evidence in support of or in refutation of his work.
'!he remaining purpose of this study is to PrOOuce an
errpirical nodel to test Peltzman I s theory. '!his study provides
such a nodel by identifying an operational set of variables
which can be applied generally to a number of case studies.
In addition, the nodel is sufficiently general so as to allow
for a testing and carparison of the sirrpler nodels of regulatory
capture. Finally, the nodel is used to expand upon previous
research, which focused upon post-capture effects, by examining
the factors which explain why capture occurs.
B.) Early Literature - the "capture Hypothesis"
"~ed by the state legislature and
aligned with the profession they oversee,
dental licensing boards inhibit competition
through restrictive licensing practices. ,,1
'!he developrent of the capture theory can be divided into
three stages. '!he early capture literature was conce:med
largely with the effects of regulation over occupational and
professional groups. '!his first stage, that of the "capture
hypothesis," generates Sate theory and considerable evidence
of situations where regulation favorably affects the regulated.
In the studies in this stage it was assmed that capture
by the regulated group had occurred. In general we can nodel
this hypothesis as:
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W = F (C,S.) where
.1.
W= wealth or welfare of the capturing profession or
industl:y
C = a dt:mll¥ variable (typically) I having a value of 1
if regulation favorable to the profession is in place
and 0 is otheI:Wise.
Si = a vector of other independent variables which affect
the group' s ~alth.
A nurrber of studies were undertaken examining a variety of
regulaticns I but ~ types of regulations rrost often considered
\\Jere advertising and entl:y restrictions. with respect to adver-
tising restrictions I conventional microeconomic theory predicts
that restrictions on the anount and type of advertising done by
professionals I and therefore the anount of infornation provided to
consurrers, will influence search costs. Where infonnation is re-
stricted, consurrers face higher search costs and therefore tend to
search less, resulting in the ability of producers to charge higher
prices.
Benham's Studies
Over the past decade Lee Benham has produced two studies on
the effect of advertising restrictions on the price of prescription
eyeglasses. Both studies generate evidence that the expected effect
of regulation of this type does indeed occur. '!he tw:> studies are
similar in fonnat. Both atterrpt to neasure the price, p, which
consurrers paid for their eyeglasses as a function of a nurrber of
variables. Both estimated equations of the fonn
P. = a + b Xl' + ~ S XJ , +.}.t, where i = 1 ••• 50 is indexed over the1 1 .1. J=2 J .1. .1.
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states examined, and J = 1•.•N is the number of independent
variables tested.
In the first study the key feature was the variable Xl' which
was a dumty variable registering whether or not eyeglasses were
purchased in a state where there was a total ban on advertising.
Benham I s atpirical work found the value of the coefficient bl to
be positive and significant at the .01 level. Hence the result of
this study was to denonstrate that in states where advertising
was harmed, the restriction on consumer info:rmation had in fact
led to differentially higher (by $7.48) prices for eyeglasses than
in states where advertising was not restricted. Fran this evidence
Benham concluded that optaootrists in sane states had captured
egul . 2~ alion.
The second Benham study differed fran the first in two ways. 3
First the new study included a second equation in the IOOdel.
Along with the equation for the price of eyeglasses a danand
equation was also estimated, which was of the fonn:
A m
Qi = ex + 61 Pi + J2 ~ ~ + lli' where Qi = the likelihood that
glasses were purchased.
The nore important difference, though, was that in the
original price equation the Xl dunmy variable was replaced with
three alternative measures of professional control. The nost
successful measure, called AQ.2\MEM, is a measure of the proportion
of optaretrists in each state who are also members of the state
optaretric association. 4 Benham describes, at saoo length,
several sets of entrance requirements for optanetrists to be
eligible for membership in the state optaretric association.
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'!he evidence is qui.te clear that rrernbership requires the
optanetrist to severely restrict his advertising.
Benham I s findings in the second study sho.v that as AOAMEM
rises, across states, prices also rise. 5 '!his result is not at
all surprising. Given that the association rrenbers are required
to restrict their advertising practices one would expect to
find (as Benham did in his first study) that the rrore suppliers
in a state who restrict advertising, relative to those who do
not, the higher will be the average price paid for eyeglasses.
'!he AOAMEM variable, neasuring the proportion of optare-
trists who are rrernbers of the state optaretric association, is
a measure of the proportion of opt<:lletrists who restrict their
0Nn advertising activities. It does not generate a treasure
of the optcmetrists I control over all suppliers or of the ability
of optaretrists to capture regulation as Benham suggests.
Instead, the variable describes professional control in a nmch
rrore limited sense of the ~-professionalcontrol over
the rrenbers of the profession. Benham I S work then, can best be
described as a derronstration of hCM one group of suppliers, by
restricting their 0Nn rcerrbers actions, has affected the price
f .. I 6o prescr1ption eyeg asses.
Shepard I s Study
A second type of regulation which has been examined for its
effect on markets is the regulation of entry. Here microeconanic
principles predict that any regulation which limits the number
of actual or potential suppliers in a market will cause a
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higher equilibrium price and laver equilibrium quantity to be
generated in that market. Hence licensing examinations,
registration fees, govemnent certification, and the like act
as entry barriers which benefit present suppliers and are there-
fore typically desired by professional groups.
Lawrence Shepard's case study on dental boards' licensing
practices is one of a nUll"ber of studies examining entry regula-
tion. 7 In Shepard's study, the regulation of concern pertains
to licensing reciprocity. In dentistry, as in many other pro-
fessions, a state license is required before practice is allowed.
As of 1970, several of the fifty u.s. states had statutes
which allowed dentists who were licensed in another state
to nove freely into their own state and practice their pro-
fession, without having to fulfill any additional requirenents.
~e majority of states though had no such reciprocity statutes.
Instead,in these states an out-of-state professional, although
duly licensed in his hare state (and often having proven his
canpetence by passing a national dental board exam as well) was
excluded fran practice within the new state until further re-
quirenents were fulfilled. 'lhese requirerrents included a
minimum nunber of years of experience (usually five), a
differentially higher registration fee, endorsenent by the
new state's dental board, and, nest i.rrIx>rtant, canpletion with
a passing grade of the new state's dentistry exam.
Shepard and others have argued convincingly that the
individual state's examinations do not correctly test
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an individual's carpetence. '!hese tests often focus on tech-
nique and substance which is theoretical, and rarely if ever
actually practiced. Shepard's claim is that because of this
additional test requirenent and because of the nature of the
exam, out-of-state professionals are unduly restricted. fran
entry into the new state. He supports this claim with evidence
shaving the dramatic differential in failure rates between in-
state and out-of-state test takers. '!he evidence shavs that
am::mg new dental school graduates the failure rate for out-
of-state applicants was rrore than nine tines that of in-state
applicants. 8
As a result, there is clear evidence of an institutional
factor affecting the supply side of this market. '!he supply
of dentists in any state is partly a function of the reciprocity
policy of that state. In states where legislation forbids
reciprocity, dentists ·practicing their profession are protected.
fran the threat of carpetition fran out-of-state licensees.
'!his decrease in potential carpetition is expected. to result in
higher equilibrium prices and incares for dentists in these
non-reciprocity states.
rrhe evidence which Shepard presents supports these hypo-
theses. First, using A.D.A. naticnal dental fee survey figures
for the prices of 12 carmon dental services, dental service
price indicies were constructed for each state. Using a Z-
statistic to test the significance of the difference in the
nean value of the indicies in reciprocity vs. non-reciprocity
states, Shepard found the non-reciprocity states' index to be
6.5% higher--a value which is statistically significant at
the .01 level. Using a silnilar difference of the means test
Shepard also found that dentists' net ineateS for non-reciprocity
states were significantly higher than reciprocity states. 9
Shepard then developed a nnJ1tiple equation nodel designed
to dete.rmine the impact of regulation on the market. Using
a two-stage least-squares approach Shepard simultaneously solved
a system of equations, the two nest irrportant of which took the
fonn
n
- ' EP. - a. + 81 R. + . 2 8. x.. + ll.~ 1 J= J J1 1
m
YDi = a + bl Ri +~2 ~ ~ + ei
where P = the dental services price index, YO = the nean dental
net incare, R = a reciprocity dUlTlT¥ variable (R = 1 if reciprocity
was not allowed) and~, Xj are two vectors of additional inde-
pendent variables. Here again Shepard found 81 in the price
equation and bl in the ineate equation to be positive and
significant, denonstrating that the regulation restricting
reciprocity led to higher prices and incares.
Fran this evidence Shepard cane to similar conclusions
as those of Benham: first, that the regulation did in fact
have an i.npa.ct on the market, and second that capture by
dentists had occurred in sate states and that in those states
the benefits of regulation were flCMing to the professionals
being regulated.
-8-
-9-
other capture Hypothesis studies_
A recent (1982) article by Chris Paul concerning the capture
hypothesis examines the effect of regulatory capture on the
incares of the rrerrbers of the rredical profession. 10 His
concern is whether or not the process of selecting the licensing
board rrerrbers effects physicians inCCl'CEs. Specifically, he
tests whether average physician incones in states where the
licensing board rrerrbers are chosen by the A.M.A. are higher
than physician incares in states where the board is appointed
by the governor. '!he reduced form equation which Paul tested
can be described as follCMS:
5
YJ = a + (31 XlJ + i:2 (3i XiJ + 1l:t J = 1 .•• 50
where YJ is the average physician ineate in state J and XiJ is
a vector of indepen:ie.nt variables typically expected to affect
YJ • '!he critical variable for Paul, XIJ, is again a durrIl1Y
variable taking on a value of 1 if the licensing board is
selected by the A.M.A. and 0 if the governor appoints the
board nenbers. '!he expectation is that (31 > O--when the
regulatory board is captured by the professionals the resulting
regulations will be !TOre favorable to physicians and lead to
higher incares for this group. '!he errpirical tests done by
Paul found supJ;X)rt for this hypothesis as a significant (.05
level) (31 = 2856 was found (suggesting that capture resulted
in a $2856 income differential).ll
Numerous other studies on the irrpact of regulation
-10-
have been undertaken over the past two decades. A 1976
article by John Cady dealt with the effects of advertising
regul ti' dru' 12 , ............::1 1 1" dru 'a ons on 9 pr1ces. His m ..JUe exp ammg . 9 pr1ces,
P, was similar to that:. of Benham' s first case study and can
be described in the same fashion as
N
Pi = a + Sl Xli + J:2 SJ XJi + lli' where Xl' again a durrnw
variable, has a value of 1 if drug price advertising is pro-
hibited. As was the case in the Benham study, cady found Sl to
be positive (81 = .029) and significant (.01 level) denonstra-
ting that p~ice advertising regulations over retail drug
suppliers caused (2.9%) higher prices for drugs in those states
than in states where such advertising restrictions were not in
effect. 13
In a canparative study of three professional groups, Arlene
Holen derronstrated that variations in professional licensing
arrangarents affected the nobility and ineateS of lawyers,
dentists,and physicians. 14 Holen conpared the interstate
nobility rate of the first two professions, where rrost licensing
lx>ards require state specific exams to be passed, with that of
physicians, where "there is an elaborate and effective system of
reciprocity. " She found lCMer nobility rates for the first
two groups where entI:y restrictions were rrore severe. In
addition she found evidence, reported in a nurrber of tables,
showing a tendency of failure rates on licensing exams to
, 'l 1 ted 'th ' 15to be POS1t1ve y corre a W1 average meate.
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In his 1965 study, Charles Plott examined the market effects
of price fixing regulations set by the Oklahana dl:ycleaning
l ' . 1-..... ...-d 16 ,J.censmg !.JUCU.' • Plott carpared Oklahana. wJ.th Kansas,
where no such price fixing regulations existed and found evi-
dence, denonstrated in a large number of tables, that the grcMt:h
in the number of establislurents, total revenues, and the total
errployrrent of lal::x>r and other resources was higher in Oklahana,
where it was assumed that a licensing board (made up of 3
narbers of the profession) we>uld fix minimum prices al::x>ve the
canpetitive prices found in Kansas.
other studies of the effects of regulation on rrarkets
include nunerous F.T.C. reports, one example being a 1974 report
th t 1 ' , . .. d 17 'Ih udieden e e eVJ.sJ.on repaJ.r serVJ.ce m ustry. e report st
the inpact of various different rrethods of controlling the
quality.of service (by controlling fraud) in the indUStry. (he
of the study's ccnclusions was that prices for service repairs
in areas where a licerising exam is given to all who desire entry
into the industry are higher than prices in unregulated areas.
'!he report denonstrated, using a difference of rreans analysis
similar to that used by Shepard, that New Orlean's prices for
T.V. repair (where licensing is required) were significantly
higher than in san Francisco and washington, D.C., where no
license is needed. '!he report further concluded that the
. preferred rrethod of ccntrolling consurrer fraud is by instituting
an investigative board (as is done in san Francisco) which is
not daninated by industry nenbers.
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A central therre of the articles cited above, and explicitly
stated by Benham and Shepard ,is that of regulatol:)7 capture. '!he
studies denonstrated that not only did regulation affect the
equilibrium in the market but that the. effect favored the group
being regulated. '!he authors were concerned with the fact that
the regulation of these service-oriented professionals was
often being controlled by the professionals themselves. As
a result, it was suggested that the regulations were not being
designed (as suppliers insist) with the protection of the public
in mind, but instead were designed and implem:mted to advance the
econanic well-being of the rrerrbers of the profession.
It is essential to note that the scope of these articles,
and the errpirical work therein, is limited to the resolution of
the question of whether (and hCM) regulation affects the market.
For exarrple, the question which Benham explores in his studies
is sirrply: do restrictions on advertising lead to higher prices?
His reponse, quite clearly, is yes. A quite different question
which evol'le5 as a natural extension of Benham's work concenlS
regulatol:)7 capture. If, as Benham has denonstrated, variations
in regulaticns do affect prices, then it is of value to explain
the causes of the variations in these regulations. Benham
irrplies that regulatory capture has occurred wherever adver-
tising restrictions are in place. ~ere is a distinct difference,
though, between denonstrating the impact of advertising regulation
on prices, as Benham has done, and denonstrating the ability of
a group to capture regulation, or in other words, identifying
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the causes of the variations there, across states) in the existing
regulatioo•
Shepard IS sttrly invites a parallel reaction on the part
of the reader. Although the differential between the equilibrium
prices and incones of dentists in states allONing, and those
forbidding, reciprocity has been established theoretically and
anpirically, no explanation has been offered in response to the
logical follav-up question of my the variations in dental regu-
lations exist. Similar follav-up questions remain mrresolved
in the studies by Paul, cady, and each of the others nentioned
above.
As Richard Posner suggests, an answer to these questions
was not readily available' because there did not exist a "capture
theory" but si.nply a hypothesis of regulatory capture. 18 Poli-
tical scientists and others had developed a perception of
industry groups being able to "capture" regulation. Econanists
such as Benham and Shepard had shcMn the irrpact on the markets
(and especially the suppliers in those markets) where regula-
tion was in place. But to this point no theory had been de--
. veloped to explain when capture would occur, or why in sate
cases it had not occurred, or what would be the outcare of a
situation where a nunber of occupations/industries with can-
peting interests atterrpted to capture regulation. 19 A theory
of regulatory capture would have to go beyond the si.nple asser-
tion that regulation is capturable and will be captured. It
must be able to provide an explanation as to where and why a
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group will (or will not) be successful in the regulatory arena.
It is these questions then which bring us to the second stage
in the developrent of the capture theory--t:he "predatory
capture" theory.
C#) '!be Predatory capture '!beery
In a 1971 article George Stigler offers the first attenpt
to develop a theory of regulatory capture. 20 In his work stigler
makes use of basic econanic principles to generate a description
of a process by which capture (as found in the studies which l:x:>th
preceded and follCMed his work) occurs.
~ first postulate which Stigler brings forth is simply
that the notivation of any interest group is ineate or profit
maximization. Stigler' s work brings to the forefront the
idea that not only does regulation result in a reallocation of
resources, but also it affects incare and wealth distributions.
'!he state, unlike the marketplace, has the unique power to tax
and transfer incare arrong groups in our society. 'Ib the extent
that regulation alters the equilibrium price and quantity
achieved in the unregulated market, various types of regulations
essentially result in different. wealth transfers. '!be demand
for regulation by any group is thus seen as being the denand for
a favorable wealth transfer to that group. 21
Stigler argues that the intensity of the demand for various
types of regulation should play an important role in ITDdeling
the existence of regulation. 'Ibis de.m:md intensity may vary
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either across professions or across states within one profession
and if so, the question of why variations in regulations exist
can be answered in part by looking at the variations in the
strength of the demand for regulation.
At the outset of his work Stigler states,
"A central thesis of the paper is that as a
rule regulation is acquired by the indusUy
and is designed and operated primarily for
its benefit. "22
Ie then goes on to explore, in an errpirical portion of the paper
(to be discussed belCM) lithe characteristics of an occupation
which give it political pa-Jer".23 Given these
essential elerrents of Stigler's work, we may define Stigler's
interpretation of capture as follCMS: '!here exists a well
defined professional/indusUy group, the demander of regulation,
which actively seeks regulation, and that group' s success is
dependent largely upon certain characteristics (to be defined
below) of the group and the environrcent in which it exists.
In a recent article on the capture of railroad regulations,
Richard Zerbe uses the tenn "predato:ry capture" to describe
Stigler' s work. 24 '!his tenn is appropriate given Stigler's
perception of an industry "acquiring" regulation and given that
the acquisition to which he refers is clearly an aggressive
behavior on the part of the group. Consequently, the tenn
"predatOlY capture" will henceforth be adopted when referring
to Stigler's interpretation of regulatolY capture.
'Ihe Predatory Approach: ~ ·EKanples
As rrentioned, econanic theo:ry provides an inportant tool
for determining· the strength of the demand for regulation.
Exanples of this are easily achieved and a few will nON be
presented as illustrations. <A1e factor detennining the intensity
of demand for regulation would be the expected gain which the
group would receive fran that regulation. Producers I demands
for advertising restrictions, for example, may vary across
industries for the sinple reason that in sorre industries
advertising restrictions may lead to .substantially higher search
costs and hence large price increases, while in other industries
the effect of advertising restrictions on prices may be much
smaller.
Of equal irrportance in establishing the intensity of any
group I s demand for regulation is a detennination of the costs to
the group of obtaining regulation. Here, as Posner has dem:>n-
strated, the theory of cartels may help locate scree of these
costs since, in sate respects, the costs of establishing either
, "1 25 cart 1 th ' dia cartel or regulaticn are sJ..ItU. ar. e eory m cates
that one inportant cost facing the cartel nerrbers is that of
organizing and agreeing up:::>n an optilral strategy. Finns
willing to join a cartel must neet and make decisions concerning
prices, the division of market shares, etc. Even if the
nerrbers accept that a cartel is in the best interests of
all firms, though, it is saret.i.nes true that the cartel never
evelves beyond the initial organization stages. Variations in
-16-
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finn sizes, pre-cartel profits, managerrent objectives, and
the like may result in an inability of all rrembers to agree on
a strategy.
'!he sane types of costs face any group which chooses to use
regulation rather than cartelization to inprove its position.
'lhis group must also organize and develop goals and strategies
with which each nernber is willing to confonn. Here, one key
strategy ooncerns heM to best use the "legislative marketplace. It
'Ihe individual rrembers of the group Im.lSt first agree t.IIXlIl a rrost
desirable fonn of regulation to seek, and then must work to-
gether to achieve their camon goal.
GiveIl that a rrost desirable fonn of regulation can be
agreed upon, the group must still enter the political arena to
annOlmce and work for the acceptance of its demand. Once
again there will be costs to face. As Stigler and others have
pointed out, the legislative marketplace maintains one very
inportant difference fran the nomal market in that once a
decision concerning an industry is made, it must be adhered
to by all who are suppliers in that industry. As a result,
the problem of the free rider may arise. Since all existing
suppliers will gain fran any pro-industry regulation inposed
en the market, there arises the incentive on the part of the
individual suppliers to forgo participation in the costly
information and organizational activities of the group, while
still receiving all of the benefits of the group's actions
when (and if) their regulatory demands are rret.
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'!he above are but a f~ examples of how econanic princi-
pIes can be used (as Stigler suggests) to rreasure the intensity
of the den:and of the "capturing group." It is this fonnat
which he then uses to test the ability of a nurrber of occupational
groups to "capture" regulation.
An flrpirical Test of Predatory capture
Having argued that regulation is but a good den:anded by
an interest group and that regulation' s existence can be ~lained
by the intensity of the demand by that group, Stigler developed
a sinple empirical nodel designed to test his theory. '!he
hytX>thesis tested was that the "predatory capture" theory of
regulaticn could be used to explain variations, across states,
in the year in which regulation over entry first took place in
a nUl'l"ber of different occupations. For each of eleven occupa-
tions, tested separately, his test nodel was:
YEAR of 1st REG = a + Sl OCC SIZE + S2 % URBAN + e
Although Stigler did not specifically present it as such,
the nodel can be interpreted as being equivalent to a reduced
fonn supply and demand equilibrium. '!he YEAR OF 1st RmJIATION
over an occupation depicts the equilibrium year in which entry
regulations were supplied, while the right hand side variables
rreasure den:and intensity on the part of the occupations being
studied. Fran the predato:r:y capture interpretation, legislative
supply is largely passive; -regulation is demand detennined.
Although additional rreasures of demand conditions were
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suggested only two were seen by Stigler as operational. '!he
first, ~ SIZE, was used as a neasure of the voting strength
of the occupation. It was ro<pected that the larger the value
of this variable, the earlier the year in which pro-industry
regulation first took place. According to Stigler, a large
value for this variable indicates a strong demand (nurrber of
votes in an election) by the occupation.
'!he second variable tested, % URBAN, neasures the
urbanization of the nembers of the occupation. Stigler expected
that as the percentage of occupation nembers living in urban
areas (and therefore relatively close to one another) grew,
the costs of organizing for political action would fall. In
highly rural states, where large percentages of nerrbers are
physically dispersed, the organization and infonnation costs
would be high. In states with a large percentage of occupation
nembers living instead in a few urban areas, these costs would
be reduced and the pro-occupation regulation demands would be
acquired at an earlier date.
'Ihe results of his tests generated at best lindted enpirical
SupfOrt for the "predatory capture" nodel. Statistical signifi-
cance was found in one of the two independent variables in eight
of the 11 equations (for 11 occupations) tested. In only one
case were both variables significant. Stigler cites data
problens as a primary cause of the insignificant and often
. . . ed . ff' . ts 26J.nappropr~ately s~gn regress~on coe ~c~en .
~re i.JlI:ortantly, the estimation technique used by Stigler
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is inappropriate. 'Ihe Stigler work appears in fact to be
testing the follONing: for a given occupation, for those states
which have instituted entry regulation, do the t\YO independent
variables given explain the year in which regulation first
took place? 'Ibis awroach leaves out the valuable information
that sate states had not instituted regulation--a fact which
daoonstrates that predatory capture is not l.R1iversal.
'!he Public Interest Hypothesis
By his CMI1 admission Stigler's work largely accepts the
proposition that it is the industry which acquires the benefits
of regulation passed by a legislature. By conventional wisdom I
though) there are t\YO broad approaches by which the existence
of regulation has been explained: 1) sare fonn of regulatory
capture and 2) the "public interest II hypothesis.
W1at is camonly knCMn as the public interest hypothesis
was perhaps the first atterrpt to explain the evolution of regu-
lation. As its nane suggests this hypothesis proposes that
regulation is established to rreet the needs of the (non-producing)
public. Here the public's interest nay be loosely defined27 as
being accol.R1ted for if regulation leads to one of the follONing:
1) correction of a market inequity such as excess profits re-
sulting fran a natural nonopoly or 2) correction of a socially
undesirable narket outcare, for exarrple, a pollution externality
or poor quality of service. '!he public interest hypothesis, then,
identifies the existence of regulation with the prior existence
of sare public ''bad'' and the public' s desire to correct the
prcblem.
Stigler is aware of the ccrcpeting hypothesis and its
relevance in sate settings. His \«)rk, though, suggests that in
nost cases where a link can be drawn be~ the public interest
and an existing regulatioo, the presence of the regulation is in
fact explained by the existence of a demand by sore industry
group which also desires the sane regulation. Furthenrore, in
dealing with the process of acquiring regulation, only the
industry is focused upon. In his errpirical work on occupa-
tiena! licensing he thus rejects the concept of the public
being a serious political force and instead tests solely the
strengths and abilities of the occupational group. In the
studies cited above, though, the conclusions were drawn fran
a conparison of states (or cities) where a regulation bene-
fited either the public or the industry (but not roth), and
the evidence shcMs that in nunerous cases the industIy did
not prevail. Still retraining, then, is the question of why the
variation exists, if regulation can be explained by a predato:ry
capture nodel.
In those cases where a regulation can be interpreted as
a zero-sum gane (for exanple, where ent:ry restrictions raise
prices and producers gain what consurers lose) it is not possible
to fully explain the pattern of existing regulation with the
"public interest" hypothesis alone or the "predato:ry capture"
hypothesis alone. 28 Vbat is needed is a theo:ry of regulation
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which is sufficiently general so as to allCM for either, or
both. '!he theoretical work by sam Peltzrran, stage III of the
capture theory, provides such an approach, where the two
tin· h'~'h.o . 29canpe g 'Xt"'-'~~ses can coexJ..st.
D.) '!he Peltzman 1-bdel
'!he first unique contribution of Peltzman' s work lies in
the fact that regulation is looked at fran the point of view
of the regulator. Along with the work by Stigler and others
en the behavior of the interest group, Peltzrnan has incorporated
the fundanental elemants of a theory of the behavior and in-
centives of the regulator/legislator "being captured."
Peltzman's work begins with the simple yet vital realization
that a legislator's prilraJ:y objective is to maximize the poli-
tical support-both in tenns of votes and campaign contributions
-which he receives at election tine. Given this assurrption,
the legislator can be nodeled as an econanic agent who must
decide upon a strategy whereby the fOllll of regulation he
chooses, and hence the arrount and direction of the wealth
transfer he chooses, maximizes the likelihood of his reelection.
Fomally, Peltzman' s rrodel has each legislator maximizing
a majority M, given
M = n • f - (N-n)· h where
n = nurrber of potential votes in the beneficiary group
f = net probability of support by a beneficiary30
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N = total nurrber of potential votes (thereby rraking N-n
the number of potential votes of the losing group)
h = net probability that an individual who loses opposes.
'!he probability of support, f, is then given as
f = f(g) where 9 = T - K - C(n)
n
T = total $ anotmt transferred to the beneficiaxy group
K = total $ spent by beneficiaries (carrpaign ftmds, etc.) 31
C (n) = cost, to the beneficiaxy group, of organizing
'!he probability of opposition, h, is given as
h = h (t, K/N-n)
Hence, opposition is assurred to increase with the tax rate and
decrease with the carrpaign dollars available fran the beneficiaxy
group, used to educate the losing group.
Finally, the wealth transfer, T, rcsulting fran regulation
is assurred to be generated fran a tax, of rate t, on the wealth,
B, of each rrember of the losing group, so that
T = t · B(N-n)
Given that the legislator has three decision variables n,
T, and K, there exist three necessaxy conditions which must be
IlEt in order for a maximum majority to be achieved. Fran these
first-order conditions Peltzman generates a number of conclu-
sims. '!he nest i.nportant result can be extracted fran the
necessaxy condition concerning the decision variable T, which is,
1~ = 0 = f - ht (8 + tS) or rewritten we find-~ 9 ·-.t
1
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An explanaticn of this condition, in Peltzrran' swords,
is that the legislator must choose T in such a way that "the
marginal political return fran a transfer must equal the marginal
~liti~lcost of the associated tax. ,,32 In other words any
ti.ne a legislator considers a change in regulation which
results in a transfer of wealth fran one group to another, he
must realize that every $1 transferred to the beneficiaIY group
results in a certain increase in political support which will be
received fran that group. At the sane ti.ne, though, the $1
taxed fran the losing group will result in a certain decrease
in the political support which the legislator can expect to
receive fran this group. Hence, to choose the optimal T, the
legislator will choose that value where the marginal gain to
him (in terms of political support) is just offset by the
marginal loss.
'!his result is extrerrely irrportant in that it suggests that
even if only ooe interest group receives all of the benefits
associated with a change in regulation the incentives of the
legislator force him to consider, at the margin, all of the
different .interest groups which are affected. As we have seen,
the "predatory capture" theory has suggested that the industry/
occupational group typically is the one to capture regulation,
or in other words, the legislators are- seen as taking on the
interests of the industry/occupation alone. '!he expanded
"capture" theory as described by Peltzrran is nore canpletein
that the interests of all groups are accounted for Dy the
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legislators (albeit with different weights). If the desired
regulation will effect "the public" then their demand must
be taken into account. If the proposed regulation will impact
another industry/occupatiooal group, the legislator will
pay heed to the political losses he will suffer by hurting that
group. In a broad sense then, Peltzman IS nodel generates a
dictionary definition of capture--in other words, any group can
capture regulation. '!hus one is no longer forced into the
m.desirable position of having to choose between accepting
either the "predatOlY capture" or the "public interest" theory,
neither of which, by itself, is sufficient to fully explain
the variations in present regulations, either across occupa-
tiens or across states within one occupatien.
N1ereas the capture hypothesis studies can be nodeled
quite generally as W = F (C), these studies do not explain C.
'!he predatory capture theolY, C = G(X) where X is a vector of
variables measuring the occupation IS political strength, can
be seen as explaining the cases where predatory capture occurs
33(C=l) , but not, or not fully, the cases where it does not.
Peltzman I S work can be interpreted as addressing the question
of capture rrore broadly. His work can be rrodeled quite
generally as C = H(X,R) where R is a vector of independent
variables measuring the demands/interests, and political.
strength, of opposition groups. Within this frarteWOrk the
cases where predatory capture by the occupation does not occur
(C=O) are rrore fully explained.
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'!his interpretation of Peltzman' s nodel as being of the
fonn C = H(X,R) follows quite clearly fran the objective
function in Peltzman' s fonnulation of the nodel. Recall that
the objective of the legislator is to maxmimize the majority
M,,Where M = f • n - h (N-n) • '!he f and h variables measure the
prOOability of support and opposition to the legislator.
Clearly, the X and R variables are precisely those factors which
are needed to neasure f and h. If it is in the legislator's
interest to listen to the demands of groups in his constituency,
then the intensity of those demands (X and R) will indicate the
likelihood of the support/opposition (f and h) of these groups,
and thereby explain the existence, or lack thereof, of the
occupation-favoring regulation.
'Ihe theoretical m::x1el is canplete. What still renains
though is the identification of a set of variables (X and R)
which can be applied when attempting to explain regulatory
capture in a variety of occupational settings.
Evidence Concerning Peltzman' s 'Iheo:ry
Since Peltzman' s work a limited number of articles have
been written attenpting to generate empirical support for his
nodel. In his 1978 study of the I.C.C., 'IhataS M:x:>re has
denonstrated that tyx) groups have gained fran I.C.C. regula-
tion--labor, and owners of truck operating rights. Using trucking
payroll data he presents a table of data shaving that enployee
carpensation is 30% higher in regulated than in unregulated finns.
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He also generates evidence of high (40-70%) returns on investnent
en the purchase of the camon carrier certificate. 34
In an earlier (1969) study, -t-bore similarly argues
that the pattern of licensing of occupations in Chicago and
in Illinois, while benefiting the regulated by restricting entry,
also protects the public interest. 35 He argues this point by
suggesting that the occupations licensed earliest were those of
greatest inportance to the public and those (e. g., n:edicine)
where the public's infonnation is the px>rest. rrhe inportance
to the public (neasured by total incare of the occupation) and
the public's lack of infomation (neasured by the nurrber of
years of education of the professicnal) were both found to be
statistically significant and of the appropriate sign in a
multiple regression explaining the year regulation took place.36
Path of Moore's studies are consistent with Peltzman' s
theory. 'IhePeltzman nodel suggests that a rational legislator
will spread the gain over many groups if this strategy prarotes
his CMI1 reelection goal, and in each of his studies MJore has
derronstrated that nore than one group has gained fran a
regulation. 'Ihe limitation of M(x)re's studies though is that
they cnly denonstrate that several groups who were interested
benefited from regulation. rrhey do not denonsrate that the
extent to which each group gained was a function of its
ability in the legislative marketplace.
A third study, by Keith Leffler, examines the licensure
of physicians in the u. s. 37 Leffler detronstrates, by calculating
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a Z-statistic of the difference in the rrean inca-ces of physicians
in states where a national exam is accepted vs states where
it is not, that physicians in the latter group had significantly
(. 05 level) higher incares. He follCMS this up, though, with the
argurrent that oonsurrers in different states desire different
standards. First, if quality is a nomal good, higher incare
ccnsurrer groups will desire higher licensing standards. Second,
if groups differ in the extent to which they believe in a
"society knCMS best" philosophy, the licensing standards should
also vcuy.. Measures of both of these public interest hypothesis
variables were found (again, in a multiple regression equation)
to help explain variations in the licensing standards.
Ieffler's general conclusion then, like ~re's, was that
both groups benefit fran the regulation. lJhe evidence in leffler's
study is also consistent with Peltzman' s nodel if the rational
legislator is seen as atterrpting to split the benefits accruing
fran this regulation. Here again though, no evidence is given
that it is, in fact, the political strengths of the different
groups which have detennined the benefit split chosen.
Perhaps the strongest support of Peltzrn:m' s nodel is
presented in a 1980 article by Sharon Oster. Oster's work
examines the causes of interstate variations in each of four
different consumer regulations. In her study she generates
etpirical evidence, in the fonn of significant paraneters in
UX;IT equations, that the existence, or lack thereof, of each
regulation in any state depends upon both the demands of
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OOn.stmlerS and the da:nands of prcrlucers. Her work indicates
that variations (across states) in the intensity of these
demands helps to detennine the existing pattern of regulation
across all states.
One of her case studies at~ted to explain whether a
holder in due oourse (HIOC) law, which has the effect of
forcing oonsuroors to make payments for defective prooucts
purchased on credit, was waived in any state. The nndel
estiJnated took the fonn
Y. = ex. + SJ XJ . + e. i = 1•.. 50, where Y. was a binary1. J. J. J.
variable, having a value of I if the HIOC law was waived, and
XJ was a vector of consumer and prcrlucer pressure variables
(described belav) •
Although the erpirical work supported many of her hypo-
theses (over half of the SJ •s were significant) and therefore
Peltzman•s work, two shortcanings of this work need to be rren-
tioned. First, an analysis of the specific independent
variables used will shCM that roost of the rreasures are in-
direct indicators of consumer/producer pressure. For
exanple, Xl was a measure of the percent of the total credit in
a state originating in the retail sector. The greater the
extent to which consumers use credit in a state, Oster argues,
the greater the benefits to oonsumers fran the regulatory pro-
tection. Unfortunately, while we have a good measure of the
degree of interest of the group, again the question of whether
the group has enough political strength to affect the regulatory
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process is not examined. A preferred treasure would indicate
IlDre directly the inpact which consurrerS (or producers) have
en a legislator' s decision-ItEki.ng, instead of assuming the
link between consurrer (or prcxiucer) desires and action by
legislators.
'!he only other consurcer variable is a "canplaints on
defective products" dunmy variable, which has a value of I if
such ex:tl'Plaints ''\-Jere anong the top 20 canplaints in the state,"
and zero otheJ:Wise. 39 Here again the difference, across
states, in potential benefits to conSUl'l'ers is clear, but that
it was a variation in their political effectiveness which
causes variations in Y. is not shavn.
~
Similarly, the strangest industry pressure variable, x3'
the percent of the population belCM the poverty line, was
used as a neasure of the financial sector' s demands for
HIOC rules. Oster argued that since low inCCXle groups have
higher default rates, financial institutions in states with
high values for X3 would benefit zrore fran protection. 'Ibis
variable, as well, serves best as an indirect rreasure of regu-
latory capture. Finally, it should be noted that Oster does
include a "presence of large banks" variable but does not
explain hCM or why or indeed if they are zrore politically
"powerful" than smaller banks.
A second shortcani.ng is that the consumer/producer
pressure variables chosen are' nostly case-specific4•O Although
Oster' s work is in one sense general- - in each study her groups
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of independent variables are: 1) Consumer pressure variables,
2) Producer pressure variables and 3) An Ease of Coordination
variable-the actual rreasures used (e. g., percent retail credit)
apply to cnly one case study.
'!he value of Oster's work should not be understated. In
the case studies analyzed several of the different consumer and
producer variables are significant, generating support for
Peltzman 's nodel. In the present study though, one of the
goals will be to inprove upon works such as Oster's by
presenting a set of independent variables which are 1) nore
direct rreasures of the extent to which legislators are/must
be sensitive to cansuners and producers and 2) nore general
in the sense that the sarre variables can be applied to a
variety of different industl:y/occupation regulation cases.
D.) 'resting the Peltzman 'Iheery
'n1e present study is an examination of Peltzman' s theory
of regulation as it applies to tw::> case studies -- dentistly
and opt.aretl:y. I have chosen to focus on the regulation of
these t\VO professions for several reasons. First, the previous
studies by Benham and Shepard both claim support for the regu-
latory capture hypothesis but neither resolves the nore interest-
ing question of why predatory capture occurs in sore states
but not in others. My CMn work is therefore a logical extension
of these tw::> previous studies.
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Seccnd, service oriented markets are typical exanples
where regulators face CCXI'p:ting desires concerning regulation.
Specifically, in both of the studies to be examined there
exists a conflict between the desires of the professionals and
the desires of the consuming public. As a result, the "predatolY
capture" and "public interest" hypotheses clash. 41
Finally, there exist well defined ooundaries, states,
across which the existence of regulation varies. 'Ibis geo-
graphic breakdown of the professions into 50 markets (states)
having differences in regulation provides a logical basis for
cross-sectional analysis.
In chapter II the rrethod for inplerrenting an experirrent
testing for the variation in predatory capture will be examined.
Again it is irrportant to note that the errphasis in the study
will be upon identifying an operational set of variables which
is applicable to a nunber of different cases. 'Ibis being
accorrplished, the present work, although involving two case
studies, will in fact advance the theolY of regulatolY capture
beyond this (case by case) level of analysis.
Chapter III will present the results of the enpirical work.
A nodel of the Peltzman theolY of regulation will be carpared
with that of the predatory capture theolY. '!he evidence will
dem:nstrate that the Peltzman m:xiel is clearly preferred.
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Finally, in the present sttrly, as both Benham and Shepard have
argued, the regulations under consideration have no inpact on quality.
'Ihus, in this analysis the zero-sum game (the producers' gain in
ineare equals the ccnsuners' loss) applies.
CHAPI'ER II
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A. ) A Method of Testing for Variations in Predatory capture
'!he objective of this chapter is to design a test which
will generate an explanatioo of the variation, across states,
in the existing regulation over a professional group. '!he
predatory capture theory offers a rrechanism by which pro-
fessionals capture regulation but as the studies by Benham and
Shepard ShCM, predatory capture is not universally achieved.
Peltzmm I s theo:ry provides the theoretical reasoning for
the existing variation in predatory capture by broadening the
analysis to where the regulator encounters a variety of
interest groups.
'!he first step, then, in developing a test of Peltzmm I s
theory is to properly identify all of the interest groups.
'!he groups will be distinguished in terms of their desires/
interests vis-a-vis a particular regulation. '!hese interests
may be deduced by identifying the potential benefits/losses
to a group fran the institution of a regulation.
cnce the groups are identified we must retUD'l to the
franework of Peltzman whereby regulation is looked at from
the point of view of the regulator (as opposed to the view-
point of the "predator"). '!his is necessary since establishing
that any group will benefit from (and thus will present
demands for) a regulation is one task, while establishing
whether and why a regulator will react to these demands is
quite another. Consequently, a set of variables identifying
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the legislator .:' s sensitivity to each group and the "political
ability" of each group needs to be defined.
Finally,ance this is achieved both the Peltzrran and the
predatory nodels can be tested. '!he predatory nodel will
suggest that only the professionals' (the predators') interests
and political strengths will be reacted to by legislators.
Peltzman's theory is a generalization of the predatory theory
in which the indicators of the strengths of all groups (in-
cluding the predatory group) are included in detennining the
variation in regulation.
B.) '!he Interest Groups: Dentistry
In the study of regulation affecting dentists the regu-
lation studied by Shepard was a statute concerning reciprocity.
Fran Shepard's work the existence, or lack thereof, of this
regulation causes a wealth transfer between two groups: the
profession and the consuming public. '!he restrictive (no-
reciprocity) statute, causing higher prices (a wealth trans-
fer fran the public to the present menbers of the profession)
will be desired by the practicing dentists. '!he public would
prefer the less restrictive regulatory position which yields
lower equilibrium prices and therefore allows for a greater
quantity of dental care to be obtained. Thus, in tenns of the
wealth effects of the regulation a two group nodel is
suggested. '!he professional group though (as will be argued
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below) may be divided in tenns of their demands for the regu-
lation due to differences in non-pecuniazy effects.
'!he i.rmedi.ate consequence of having rrore than one
interest group is of course that Peltzmm I s theory can be
tested. Furthernore there exists one additional inportant
feature of the case studies at hand which should be enphasized.
It is often argued that the second group, the public, is
typically a very weak interest group. 'Ihat being the case,
this study should provide a strong test of the Peltzman theory
that legislators must be sensitive to the actions of all
interested 'and affected groups. According to Peltzman,
when considering a wealth transfer of a fixed arrount, the
rational legislator will determine the probability that making
such a transfer is rational (for him) by taking into account
both the variations in the probability of support by the pred-
atory group and t.h.e variations in the probability of opposition
by the "weak II group.
c. ) FJhe Interest Groups: cptaretry
'!he Opthalmic Goods Industry
'!he stnlcture of the opthalmic goods industry roughly
can be divided into three stages of production and distribution:
1) manufacturing, 2) wholesale labs, and 3) retailing.1 '!he
third sector of the industry, the retail sector, provides the
typical link between consurers and manufacturersjwholesalers
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which is prevalent in many industries. It is this sector
and the regulation involving the rrembers in this sector which
is of interest.
Within this retail sector there exist three groups of
eyeglass suppliers which need to be distinguished. '!he
first group of eye service suppliers consists of opthalrrolo-
gists. 'Ibis group is nade up of licensed physicians whose
specialty is the care and treatnent of the eye. '!heir functions
range fran examination of the eye and diagnosis of disease
and defects, to the perfoJ:IIance of surgery, to the prescrip-
tion of drugs and/or lenses. In addition, sore of these
physicians (approxinately 40%) also dispense eyeglasses. 2
'!he second group of retailers is optaretrists. These
professionals are licensed in alISO states and their functions
and services include examining the eye for defects in vision,
prescribing eyeglasses, and also dispensing eyeglasses. Unlike
opthalnologists though, optooetrists nay not prescribe drugs,
diagnose eye diseases, or practice surgery. Consequently,
they focus sharply on the prescribing and dispensing functions. .
The third group of retailers is opticians. '!his group,
which is largely unlicensed,3 provides a much narraver function
in the narket. '!heir functicn is even nore limited than those
of optaretrists in that they nay not examine the eye, nor
write prescriptions. COnsequently their predaninant functicn
is that of dispensing eyeglasses to consumers.
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'!he capture Variable
Of particular irrportance to the latter two groups is
whether or not CCJlIIercial finns are allowed to advertise
price. Hence we will define predatory capture as having
occurred in a state if camercial finns in that state are
not allCMed to price advertise. 'Ihe justification that this
restriction is inportant fran a theoretical point of view has
been generated in the literature on the econanics of infor-
nation. COnventional wisdan examining the question of consuner
infonnation naintains that a rational consuner will acquire
less than full infornation about the prices for the products
and services in a market since infonnation and search is costly
and at sate point the marginal cost of additional search
exceeds the gain in lower prices fotmd. 4 As a result, in
a market where infonnation has a nonzero cost, the lack of
full infonnation on the part of consurrers generates two
effects on prices.
First, the average price in the market without perfect
infonnation is expected to be higher than in the rnarket where
oonsuners are perfectly infomed. 'Ibis is true because
producers are able to charge a price, P, which is greater than
the perfect information price, PI' such that P-PI < C1, where C1
is the cost to the consuner of being fully inforned. secondly,
the dispersion in prices arotmd the mean is expected to be
higher in the ilrperfect infornation environrrent. t-hreover, the
existing evidence sup};x)rts the· theory that price infonnation
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(in the fonn of advertising) lowers price dispersions and
rrean prices in the market. Studies by Benham, cady, and Marvel,
citOO aJ:::x:we, are exanples.
In addition, a 1976 study by the F.T.C. on the optha1mi.c
goods industry found substantial evidence concerning price
dispersions. Part of the study cx:mpared price dispersions at
tile manufacturing and wholesale levels with those at retail levels.
'!he study daronstrates that at the manufacturing and wholesale level,
where the number of suppliers is small and price data flows freely
between retailers and manufacturers (via pricing catalogues), price
dispersions are minimal, whereas at the retail level, where the
number of suppliers is large and price infonnation is less avail-
able, price dispersions were significant. Thus, the report
concluded that the price dispersion at the retail level was not
due to a similar dispersion at the manufacturing/wholesale level. In
addition, the authors concluded that the lack of infonnation
at the retail level led to high price-cost margins and sub-
stantially higher prices than would be the case if advertising
restrictions were dissolved. 5
The Interest Groups
A number of interest groups arise in this study. The
opt:aretrists, as Benham makes quite clear, are the predatory
group. They have, as the follCMing quotation daoonstrates,
quite sharp interests in diminishing the role of their
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carrrercial finn canpetitors in the industry through the
introduction of "professional behavior" (e. g. no price adver-
tising) rules.
"~atetry has passed through periods of
earnest debate on the need. for professional
behavior. Today there is no longer such
debate. . . fust recently, the Arrerican
~aretric Association set a target date
in the 1970's fer the total disappearance
of camercial practice. ,,6
Specifically, the optaretrists desire to restrict
advertising and, in particular, price advertising in the in-
dustJ:y. As they are vertically integrated in the services
which they provide to constmerS they hold an advantage over
carrrercial finns in that many consurrers prefer the convenience
of "I-stop" service. Restrictions on advertising, especially
price, would limit opticians in their ability to attract
ccnsurrers away fran optaretrists by limiting their ability to
armotmce lower prices.
In1Tediately a second interest group, directly affected
by the regulation, is apparent--the eatIlErcial finns. '!heir
interest in the freedan to price advertise is quite tmder-
standable. Limited in the services they nay offer, opticians
are dependent upon sales I and the ability to carpete in tenns
of price is heavily dependent upon the ability to price
advertise. '!his group, then, will be considered (in the
Peltzman nodel) as a carpeting interest group opposing the
predators (optaretrists).
A third group which will also be considered
(again in the Peltzrran nodel) is the consuming public. The
effect of the restriction on advertising, as Benham has
shown, is to raise prices which conS'l1lTers pay. Consequently
the public as a group is ~ed to prefer allowing adver-
tising of prices to occur.
Finally, a fourth group which is to be considered is
advertising agencies. '!he regulation under consideration
pertains to advertising restrictions and therefore one would
~ that advertisers are interested in this issue and
indeed they are. Recent articles appearing in Advertising
Age support this claim. '!he articles cite evidence that
the Arrerican Advertising Agency Association is actively
interested in federal legislation, F. T.c. rulings, and
court decisions concerning advertising regulations over
dentists, lawyers, doctors, and optaretrists. 7
D. ) '!he Determinants of Predato;ry capture
Having established the interest groups concerned, we
may now begin to explain the variations across states in the
regulation under consideration. To this end I will tmn to
a discussion of the various hypotheses evolving fran the
predatory and Peltzman theories.
Following the work of Peltzman, I will maintain the
assurrption that the principal and indeed only goal of a
legislator is to maximize the likelihood of his reelection.
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Furthernore, the supply of regulation over any profession
or industJ:y group in a state is seen as being detennined
by the legislature in that state, who may either prcx:luce
legislation directly or delegate their authority to a regu-
latory agency or board. In either event, and even in the
case where the legislature allcws for carplete self-regulation,
the final authority is in the hands of the legislature. 8
Size of the Profession
A prim:uy decision variable which is needed to ~lain
the existing pattern of regulation in any setting is sene
neasure of the size of the predatory group. As suggested by
Stigler,. the number of nerrbers in the profession is one
neasure of the potential derrand for regulation in that it
neasures the nurrber of votes that the group is able to offer
to any legislator who supports their position. '!he absolute
nurrber of votes a profession is able to provide, though, would
be a misleading indicator of the group' s strength. A 1, 000
rrember group derranding regulation in california, where the
total population is approximately 19 million, certainly carries
less weight than a group of the sane size in Alaska, where
the total population of the state is only roughly 300, 000
or l/6Oth of that of california. consequently, a deflation
factor is necessary to take account of the relative size of
th 'thin . te 9e· group W1 1.ts sta . In any event, the number of
nerrbers in the profession (e.g. dentists, optrnetrists) is
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one vital neasure of the strength of the "capturing group."
'!he Peltznan theory (and any nodel designed to test it)
\\lOuld also incol:pOrate such a variable. rrhe only difference
to be found may care in the fonn of interpretation of the
variable •s neaning. In a Peltzm:m-like frarrework, where the
legislator is the nest inportant econanic agent and therefore
the focus of attention, the maasure of the group' s size would
be interpreted as a neasure of the costs to a legislator (in
tenns of votes forgone) of opposing the interests of the pro-
fession. It would therefore be seen as a variable which deter-
mines the legislator' s willingness to provide regulation. '!he
points of view of the two theories concerning this hypothesis
differ but the net effect on the likelihood that the regulation
is put into place will not. As we neve across states we
expect to find that as the (deflated) group size grcMS, so
does the sensitivity of the legislator to the profession' s
interests. '!he first variable then, will in this way maasure
the likelihood that the pro-profession (predatory) regulation
is in place.
Group Organization
As Stigler' s work indicates, the ability of a group to
acquire regulation depends not only on the size of that group
but also on its effectiveness in the legislative marketplace.
For Stigler, this translates into a question of heM well
organized the group is. A cahesive, well-organized group I
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actively seeking its goal, is seen as being rrore likely to
succeed than a poorly organized one. Here, two points need to
be addressed.
'!he first, already discussed briefly, is that group
organization is costly. 'n1ere are costs involved in informing
the rrerrbers of the group of the issue at hand. '!here are
costs involved in gathering the individuals together to
devise a strategy. 'n1ere are costs involved with inplerrenting
that strategy (whether it be to hire professional lobbyists
or sinply institute a letter writing campaign). All of these
costs detract fran the net wealth gain resulting fran any
acquisition, or capture, of regulation. A rreasure of the ease
of coordination of the rrembers, then, is expected to aid in
the rreasurenent of the costs to a group of capturing regulation.
'!he Stigler variable rreasuring the percentage of the
group' s rrerrbers who live in urban areas will be used as such
a neasure. It is hypothesized that where large percentages
of the predatoxy group live in urban areas, coordination is
sinplified. Equivalently, groups faced with the problem of
having large percentages of their rrembers widely dispersed
in rural areas are certain to face higher organizational costs
and greater difficulty in capturing regulation.
secondly, as indicated above, the legislator is interested
in obtaining votes. Vben a professional group (or its
lotIDyists) presents its position to the legislator (s) it
will indicate the total nl.Jll'ber of rrerrbers in the profession
and suggest this figure to be representative of the number
of votes available to support a "friendly" legislator. The
rational legislator may well assune that this figure accurately
represents the costs to him, in tenus of lost votes, of not
supporting the group's danands.
But the legislator, as well as desiring votes, also desires
rx>n-vote support fran the group (in the fonn of campaign contri-
butions, organizational aid, etc.). Here the interests of
the individual members and that of the group may diverge. An
individual member of the profession may well be willing to
vote for his own best interests since the cost of voting is
very low. 10 That same individual though may be nuch nore likely
to tJ:y to avoid any direct cash payment of campaign support.
It is in his best interests to play the role of the free
rider-to allCM the other members to pay (campaign contributions,
etc.) while he receives the benefits which all members will
obtain if the favorable out.cxme is achieved.
The free rider problem is U1'XiUestionably an even nore
damaging problem facing the public, but the professional group
also faces this problan. One may expect, for exanple, that
individual dentists desire a no-reciprocity rule, and that the
group as a whole prefers the role, but in order to achieve
the group's goal, it is the individual members of the group
who nust bear the burden. Consa:;IUently, irrlividuals have an
incentive to cheat on the group.
The free rider problem, then, can be interpreted as a cost
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to the group of acquiring favorable regulation. 'Ihe larger
the problem, the less non-vote support the group can generate
and therefore the nore difficult predatory capture becates.
Atterrpting to neasure the free rider effect, as always, is a
difficult if not i.Irpossible task. Yet the sane factors which
neasure ease of coordination and organization of the group
also may help to indicate the extent of the free rider problem.
As well as being easier to inform and organize a group which
is located physically close to one another in urban areas, so
too it is an easier task to police individual nenber' s non-
cc:npliance with the group's goals. rrhe successful coercion
of an individual to "pay for the ride" may be a positive
function of the arrount of contact one has with his peers. For
the rural professional the <:nly contact by the group may care
via the infrequent phone call or letter, whereas the urban pro-
fessional faces colleagues in person nore frequently, and might
even be coerced, in dentistry for exarrple, by facing possible
sanctions concerning hospital appointnents for oral surgery.
Consequently, Stigler's treasure of the percentage of
group nenbers living in urban areas serves tw::> purposes; l) as
a measure (albeit :i.nperfect) of the cost of coordination by a
grouP, and 2) as a neasure of the cost of controlling the free
rider problem which faces the group. In both cases, as the
urbanization rate rises the coordination costs and free rider
costs fall and the expected inpact on the probability of
predatory capture is positive.
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Size of the Legislature
In sate recent literature it has been suggested that there
exist institutional features which nay influence the ability of
an interest group to capture regulation. Several characteristics
of state legislatures have been examined but one in particular,
legislature size, seems both reasonable and appropriate for use
in the studies at hand.
'Ibllison and ~nni.ck argue that the ability of a group
to capture regulation is negatively related to the size of
the legislature (number of nenbers in the house plus senate in
a state).11 The pri.naJ:y reason which they suggest for this
relationship is that as a legislature's size grows, each indi-
vidual legislator has less influence within the entire governing
body. A"friendly" legislator (who perhaps has received
canpai.gn support fran a group) has nore irrpact, in a relative
sense, on the total legislature.'s decisions in a state where the
legislature is small than a similar legislator in a state where
the legislature is large. '!hey tenn this the "small fish in
a big pond" effect. 12 In an errpirical test in which they
seek to explain interstate differences in the number of occupa-
tions licensed, statistically significant results are found
supp::>rting the hypothesis that nore predatory capture cx:::curs
in states with smaller legislatures. 13
Similarly, a different stu:ly by Janet Snith also generates
support for this hypothesis. 14 Snith argues, though, that the
per capita size of the legislature is a nore appropriate measure
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of the group's ability to capture regulation. It is argued
that the larger the nurrber of legislators per capita, the
closer will be the natch between the desire of the entire
population (rather than one interest group) and the actions
of the legislature. '!his can best be seen in the extrerre
case where the number of legislators per capita equals 1 (where
a referendum is used to decide an issue). In such a case a
special interest group ordinarily would have a much nore diffi-
cult tine capturing regulation. 15 Smith's study, seeking to
explain interstate differences in the number of pieces of
licensing legislation enacted, also generates enpirical
support for the hypothesis that predato:ry capture is negatively
related to the (per capita) size of the legislature. 'Iherefore
we naY have a third, this ti.Ire institutional, variable which
affects predatoJ:Y capture and which (should and) will be
included into any general nodel of regulatory capture.
E. ) '!he Detenninants of "Non-capture": Public Interest Variables
'!he hypotheses examined in section D.) above all deal with
variables which are associated with the predatory capture
theory of regulation. Each variable, it has been argued, adds
to our understanding of the intensity of derrand for regulation
by a particular group and/or that group's ability to capture
regulation.
Following the ·expanded nodel of regulation as proposed
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by Peltzman, though, while all of these variables are inportant
they do not carprise a carplete set. Given the political
support naxi.mi.zing desires of the legislator, Peltzman r s nodel
argues that the legislator will take into accotmt all other
groups affected by a change in regulation, and their dem3nds
and inflte1ce as well. 'Iherefore, the consuming public, as an
interest group in these studies, nON needs to be examined. An
explanaticn of the additional hypotheses dealing with the public
(oonsl.1ItEr) demands and political strengths is presented below.
'!he public, as an interest group, is at a disadvantage as
it is an extrerrely large group which has few, if any, organ-
izations which can nobilize its nerrbers to take action favoring
the group r S interests. In addition, the sheer size of the
group is a burden as the cost of detecting which individuals
are "cheating" an the group is large if not prohibitive. Hence
the size of the problem of the free rider effect is even greater
than in the case of the professional interest group. Further-
nore, the per capita gain (for those who in fact would not ride
free) is often sufficiently small so as not to warrant the pay-
nent of the necessaJ:Y costs. For these reasons, many invelved
in the field of regulatory theory support sore version of the
"predatory capture II theory of regulation.
Yet as we have seen, the profession does not always pre-
vail. 'Ihe :Public r s interest is still maintained in several
states. Hence Peltzman' s work helps to describe what nay be
tented the "non- predatory capture" states. Given our definition
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of predation as being the aggressive behavior on the part
of an industxy group, "non-capture" nay nON be defined as a
situation where the legislature does not yield to the predator,
but instead protects the interests of scm: other group.
Fdocatian
'I\vo hyp:>theses ~laining non-capture, both entirely
consistent with Peltzman, nON may be examined. First recall
that Peltzrnan IS nodel assurres that the legislator in effect
must estimate the size of the carpeting groups and then assign
probabilities to the support (or oPPJsition) that the groups
will generate. In his l:x>ok entitled An Econanic 'Iheory of
Derrocracy,16 Anthony D:Mns has generated ideas as to hON the
legislator determines these variables. DcMns I wOrk is very
similar to Peltzrnan I s17 although the forner is largely descrip-
tive while the latter is a nore fo:rmal theoretical presen-
tation. Quite clearly, Do.vns also perceives the regulatory
YJOrld fran the point of view of the rational vote rna.>dmizing
legislator.
For DcMns the info:rmation required by those involved in
the legislative marketplace is a critical feature. He
correctly suggests that for any individual to be infomed
fully he must acquire infonnaticn as to: 1) which industries
or professions are under consideration (or should be) for
regulatory change, 2) hON a given proposal would affect the
group, and 3) where the legislator (s) stand on the issue. 18
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Furthemore he argres that the uninforned voter will have his
interests less fully counted than the inforned voter. 19
'!he reason for this is straightfol:Ward. 'Ib the support maxi-
mizing legislator, the cost of voting against the uninforned
is less, at the margin, than the cost of voting against the
inforned. Indeed this is precisely what Peltzman has suggested
in his rrodel. 20 It is expected then that the less inforned
the public is (in any state) the less likely its interests
will be protected by the legislators in that state.
Measuring consUIrer infonnation-- especially in the
legislative marketplace -i_s an extrerrely difficult task. The
eccnam.c theo:ry of infonnation is not a particularly well
developed field, although sana insights fran this area are
helpful. As nentianed earlier, conventional wisdan has
suggested that increased infonnation (via advertising, etc.)
helps ICMer search costs for consuners. r.hre ilrportantly,
at least one study has generated errpirical support for the
hypothesis that efficiency of search and therefore the level
of prices and the degree of price dispersion, depend in part
on the education levels of consuners in the market. 21 Although
the stt.rly focused on cons~s in a nore conventional market
(gasoline), it is neither difficult nor impractical to expand
the analogy to include the legislative market. Just as educa-
tion has an inpact on consuners' infonnation, which in tw:n
affects producers' behavior vis-a-vis gasoline prices, similarly
it can be argued that education has an inpact on the public' s
infonnation achieved in the legislative market which in
tum affects the legislature's behavior vis-a-vis regulation.
affecting the public.
Specifically, the rcenbers of the public with vexy lav
education. levels are expected to have lCM levels of overall
awareness of the legislative marketplace. 'nlose individuals
with little or no education are expected to be less inforned
as to the issues at hand, the positions taken by various
legislators, and indeed are nest likely less aware of even
who the appropriate legislators are. Consequently, their
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demands are discounted heavily by the rational legislator. In
states with higher percentages of uneducated nembers of the
public, then, the likelihood that the public I s interests are
protected is diminished.
Voter Participation
rrhere exists a seecnd variable which also is expected
to derronstrate the public I s ability to succeed in the legisla-
tive market. N:)t cnly does a nember of the public need to be
inforned, but it is also necessaIY that the legislator be
made aware of the individual's understanding and interest in
govenurent policy decisions. In Dc:Mns' words, for any indi-
vidual (x) to be able to influence policy,
"The govenment must be aware that x
has preferences and knav what they
are. 'Ibis neans there must be camn.n-
ication. fran x to the gove11l1'1'elt ...22
Cbe rreasu:re by which legislators may neasu:re the extent of
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the public' s interests in govemrrent policy decisions is the
degree of political activity undertaken by the public. '!he
sinplest neasure of this is the voter participation rate.
IJ::M voter participation rates suggest apathy or disinterest
en the part of the public. High vOter participation rates
indicate the .opPosite ~ GiveIl rational legislators, it is
hypothesized that as voter participation rates rise, rroving
across states, so, too, does the likelihood that regulation
protects the public' s interests. 23
'!he argunents for these two "public interest" variables
are closely related to one another but are in fact distinct.
'Ihe first hyp:>thesis argu=s that a rational legislator ignores
or heavily discounts the uneducated and uninfonted whether or
not they vote. '!he second hypothesis though, argues that the
legislator ignores any nenber of the public, infonred or not,
who does not vote. For these two reasons then, the extent
of the public' s interests is also expected to play a role in
determining the existing variation in regulation. As a
result, in addition to the other (predatory) variables and
hypotheses explained ·alx>ve, these two hypotheses should be
included in any empirical examination of the Peltzrtml theo:ry
of regulation where the consuming public is an interest group.
F. ) Intra-IndustJ:y Differences
As well as the variables cited above which are applicable
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to a number of case settings, there may exist additional
rrea.sures of demand intensity which are only applicable for
particular studies. Such is the case for the two studies
at hand where within each industry it can be argued that
there exist cx:rrpeting interests which need to be nodeled into
the analysis of regulatory capture. For the optaretry study,
as mentioned above, a principil opposition eyeglass supplier
is the optician. Here the intra-industry differences in types
of suppliers creates a new opposition group whose political
strength can be rrodeled in tenus of a variable already cited--
the voting strength of the group.
'!he dentistry study is sooewhat different, though. As we
have seen, all dentists in a market (state) where the nore
restrictive (no-reciprocity) :rule is in effect will gain by
receiving higher prices. Yet, there exist differences anong
dentists in their desire for the restrictive regulation. '!he
specific regulation being examined, reciprocity, clearly affects
labor nobility. Consequently, the dentists I demands for non-
reciprocity statutes should also be affected by their desires
for nobility. sare recent literature on human resource mi-
gration sheds satE light on this area. Specifically, a 1976
study by Peter Pashigian on the effect of licensing on labor
migration derronstrated the inportance of one variable, age,
en the desire for nobility. In particular, Pashigian states,
"Dentists, lawyers, optaretrists, physicians,
veterinarians, and others invest resources
throughout their careers to develop business
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reputations and goodwill. Reputation and
knONledge of the market are in large part
location specific and becare obsolete when
the practitioner leaves the i.rrrrediate market
area. ,,24
'!hus, the age of the professional (dentists) plays a role
in determining the denand for nobility. Younger dentists,
it is ~ed, have a lower opportunity cost, in the fonn
of forgone goodwill, of relocating in a new state than the
nore established professionals. Recent dental school graduates
and those who have been practicing for but a feN years have
invested less and will forgo less by relocating. 25 rrhe
intensity of demand for non-reciprocity statutes then, is
~ to be a function of the proportion of young dentists
in a state. '!he smaller the proportion, the nore support
there will be for regulations prohibiting reciprocity and
therefore the stronger will be the total group's demand for
non-reciprocity statutes.
Furthernore, Shepard has suggested that professional
attitude surveys indicate that older dentists, those considering
partial retirenent, "favor the inproved nobility associated with
reciprocity. ,,26 Fran this infomation it is~ that
the intensity of demand for non-reciprocity statutes in any
state is also a function of the proportion of older dentists
in that state. Again as this proportion decreases we~
to find no:re support for :regulations prohibiting reciprocity
and therefore nore intense total group demand for non-recipro-
city statutes.
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carbining these ~ argunents allows us to establish one
age distriliuticn variable to capture both of these effects.
As the proporticn of those dentists in a state who are either
relatively young or relatively old (and therefore hold
stronger desires for nobility) falls, the intensity of demand
for non-reciprocity statutes is expected to rise, and along
with it the likelihood that such statutes are in fact in
place also rises. '!his treasure of the denand intensity of
the predatory group in each state will therefore be included
in the predatory capture nodel for dentistry, along with the
other variables cited above.
In canclusioo, in sections D.), E.), and F.) above we
I1CM have a set of variables which can be carbined to create
and test the Peltzrnan nodel. In additioo, a predatory nodel
can be created (for pw:poses of canparison) by si.rrply including
ooly those variables fran section D.), along with the additional
dentistry variable just examined. At this point we nay nON
tum to an examination of the errpirical rrodels used to test
these two capture theories and the resulting evidence found in
the two case studies.
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'Footnotes 'for 'Chapter "II
1 '!he source of a great deal of the following infonnation is
a Federal Trade Ccmnission, Staff Report, Advertising ofOpthallnic
Goods and services, January, 1976.
2 Consequently 60% of opthalnologists receive no ineate frem
dispensing. In addition, given that there exist several rrore
specialized functions "being provided by opthalnologists , it is
reasonable to assurre that for the remaining 40% who do dispense
sore eyeglasses, the incare generated is very snaIl in proportion
to their total incares.
3 'Ihe F. T.c. report states that only 20 states license opticians.
F.T.C. (1976), p. 21.
4 G. Stigler , "'Ihe Econanics of Infomation," Journal of
Political Econany, June, 1961.
5 Federal Trade Ccmnission, Staff Report, (1976),p. 48.
6 Benham (1975), p. 426.
7 "~aYEtrists Eye Fall Ads, "Advertising Age, ~r 16,
1978. See also, "High Court I3cX:)sts lawyers' Ad Freedan,"
Advertising Age, Febulal:Y 1, 1982, and "Doctors, Lawyers, Rap
F. T.C. ," Advertising Age., July 20, 1981.
8 Even in this extreIre case it is the legislature which
decides that self-regulaticn is acceptable. It may, of course,
alter that decision.
9 Stigler used total labor force although total population
would seem to be nore appropriate as it includes all those who
are affected by the regulation. Stigler (1972), P:-14.
10 Voting is infrequent and therefore at each polling a
number of legislative positions and referendum issues are detennined.
'!his being the case, the actual cost of voting on this one issue
(tine, transportaticn, expenses, etc.) can be spread out over the
number of decisions made.
11 R. 'Ibllison and R. McConnick, Politicians, legislation,
and the Eca1.any: An Inquiry"into "the' Interest Group "'Iheory "of
Gove.mttEnt, Martinus Nijhoss, 1981.
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12 Ibod Ch II_~_. , • I, p. 33
13 Ibid., Ch. III, pp. 52-53.
14 J. Smith, "PrOOuction of Licensing Legislation: An
Ecananic Analysis of Interstate Differences, "Journal ·ofLegal
Studies, JanualY 1982.
15 'Ibllison and McCormick make exactly this argurrent as
well but (apparently) do not enpirically test the hyp:>thesis.
16 A. Ik:Mns, An Econanic Theoxy of Dem:>cracy, Ne.w York:
Harper and ReM, 1957.
17 Indeed, as Ik:Mns' work preceeded Peltzman 's by nearly two
decades it may be appropriate to invoke the name "The Ik:Mns-
Peltzman" nodel.
18 Ik:Mns., p. 80 and p. 210.
19 Ibid., p. 248-49.
20 Recall fran Peltzroan 's nodel that f = 0 is assurred when
a beneficiary is ignorant of the issue. See footnote #30,
Chapter I.
21 H. Marvel, "The Ecananics of Infonnation and Retail Gasoline
Price Behavior: An Enpirical Analysis," Journal of PoIitical
Econany, OCtober 1976.
22 DcMns, p. 250.
23 This again is clearly oonsistent with Pe1t:man's vote-
maximizing nodel.
24 P. Pashigian, "Occupational Licensing and the Interstate
l-Dbility of Professionals," Joun1al of Law and Econanics, April
1978, p. 1. .
25 A section of Pashigian' s work showed evidence that lawyers
in relatively young/old age brackets did in fact have higher
interstate migration rates. Ibid., p. 21.
26 Shepard, p. 191.
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A.) EIrpirically Testing the 'I\oJo 'Iheories
In the previous chapter several hypotheses have been
established which will allaN for the specification of t\\1O
testable m:xlels of regulatol:Y capture for each of the two pro-
fessioos tmder study. '!he hpredatory" capture theory seeks to
explain the existing pattern of regulation within a frarrework
of two sets of variables:. 1) those nea.suring the professional
group's intensity of demand for and/or costs of acquiring
favorable regulati01"oj and 2) institutional variables affecting
the capturing group's ability to succeed in the legislative
arena. Hence the predatolY m:xlel can be written quite generally
as
1C = F(Xl , X2)
rrhe "Peltzman" capture theol:Y seeks to expand on the
"predatoxy" capture approach. '!he existing pattern of regulation
can be explained in "part, according to Peltzman, by examining
the t\\1O sets of variables described by the "predatol:Y" m:Xlel,
but the "predatol:Y" nodel' s specification is incanplete. What
is required for a proper specification is the addition of a
third set of variables rreasuring the sensitivity of the legis-
lator to opposing groups. Looking at regulation fran the p:>int
of view that the legislator is a ratiooal political support
maximi.zer, the inclusion of this third set of variables dimin-
ishes the obvious weakness of the predatoxy m::rlel--that one or
nore interested groups are eatpletely ignored. '!he "Peltzman"
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nodel then can be specified quite generally as
where R, as defined earlier
is a vector of "opposition group" variables.
Of interest then is the relative abilities of the two
rrodels in explaining the existing pattern of regulation across
states. Various nethods for carparing the two specifications
are available and the ert1?irical work perforned will be pre-
sented in the sections belCM. First though, in both of the
cases being examined I seek to explain where (in which states)
a particular regulation is (is not) in place. consequently,
the dependent variable (C) in each of the nodels is bi.naJ:y-
either a state has a regulation in place (it is a predatory
capture state) or it does not (it is a non-capture state). For
cases such as these the OLS regression nodel is inappropriate.
An appropriate technique is a PROBIT nodel. 2
PROBIT lobdels
Given the binary nature of the dependent variable, what
one seeks to find in a nodel of the fonn C = F (X) 3 is the
conditional probability of the event, C, given the values of the
independent variable, X. Fran the OLS technique a linear
probability nodel easily can be generated. Given the standard
OLS regression fonn,
C. = a, + ex + e.~ 1.
is applied we find
E(C.) = P. = ex + ax·1. 1. 1.
if the expected value operator
where Pi is interpreted
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as the probability that c. = 1 (predatory capture) given X.•
~ ~
N\.:Jrlerous problems arise fran this rrodel though.
First, the error structure for this rrodel is not normally
distributed. Although the rrean value of the error tenn is
E(e.) = 0, the variance, (J~, can be ShCMIl to be E (e~) = E(C.)·
~ ~ ~ ~
[1 - E(Ci )] and hence the classical statistical tests of the
paraneters may not be applied. 4
Furtherrcore, predictions which are uninterpretable may
also arise fran such a nodel. In diagram #1 below, depicting
the OLS nodel given a binary choice dependent variable, pre-
"dieted probabilities such as C6 lie outside the 0, 1 interval.
Given. the set of observations Xl..•X6 we can see that for
values of X > Xs the predicted probability of predatory capture
is greater than one -- a 'staterrent which does nOt have a clear
meaning.
X, x,
Diagram #1
C:.I
(=0
1\
C~
OLS f{E('~fSjION
LINE
'!he PROBIT nodel avoids thes~ and other p~oblems by trans-
fonning the X vector using the cumulative normal probability
funetion. Using the PROBIT technique we have:
-4-
I LZ -s2/2C = G(Z) = - - e . ds where Z = Y + BX
v'2TI -00
COnsequently, Z, a linear function of the original X vector,
is transfonred using the cumulative nonnal probability
function (for PROBIT). 5 Using this transfornation we generate
a reasonable set of probabilities as 0 ~ C ~ I must occur, by
construction. In addition, the change in the probability is
dependent on the level of the index Z--the regression
line is curved as shown in diagram #2 belCM.
Diagram #2
_~~=+- --..L "1 -:: ~ t ex
l, f). 2j C=O
'!he changing slope is nore appealing in that it suggests that
for large values of Z (such as Z6 where the probability of
predatory capture approaches unity) a change in Z has little
effect on the probability of predatory capture.
Finally, as well as generating predictions on the likeli-
hood of predatory capture, the PROBIT nodel will generate the
usual set of pararreter estimates for the independent variables.
~se paraneters are to be interpreted differently (as will be
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ShONl1) fran their Drs counterparts, but have been shcMn to
be consistent estimators. 6 Using the PROBIT nodel I will
nON examine the two theories of regulatory capture as they
apply to dentistJ:y and optaretJ:y.
B. ) Dentistry Results
Data and ~asurenent of the Variables
As the present nodels of the capture of dentistry regu-
lation are an attenpt to expand upon the earlier study by
Shepard, the present study will look at the 1970 cross-state
pattern of regulations as well. '!he dependent variable, once
again, is binary. States are defined as predatory capture
states (where no reciprocity exists) or non-capture states
(where reciprocity exists) • '!he infomation concerning reci-
procity cares fran the 1970 Anerican Dental Association Di-
rectory and Shepard' s study. 7 Forty-eight states are examined. 8
'!he remainder of the data used in this study cane fran a
variety of govenment sources.
Data for the first two predatory capture variables are
fran 1970 census data for selected health occupations. 9 '!he
first variable, DENTIST, is a rreasure of the per capita nurrber
of dentists in each state. '!he second, % URBAN, is treasured
as the proportion of dentists in each state who live in urban
areas. '!he third variable, % IDBILE, is constructed fran
data in a 1970 Departnent of Health, Education and ~lfare
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(H.E.W.) study.lO For this variable, recall that we desire
a~e of the proportion of dentists in each state who are
either young or old and therefore desire rcore rcobility . The
H.E.W. study classified data into three age groups: the
percentage of dentists under age 35, under age 45, and over age
45. The variable constructed for this study was the sum of the
first and third groups. A nore accurate ~ure 'WOuld perhaps
set the older age group at age 50 or 55 but such data
were not available. Finally, the fourth predatory capture
variable, LSlZE, is the measure (as suggested by Tollison
and McConnick) of the size of the legislature and is measured
as the total number of members in the house plus senate in
each state's legislature. The source of the data for this
variable is the 1970 Governrrental Affairs Institute publication
entitled,Anerica Votes.
Data for the two additional variables tested in the Peltz-
man IOOdel are fran different sources. First, VPR, is a ~ure
of the 1970 voter participation rate in each state. This
variable is a neasure of the percent of the population who
voted in statewide elections. As 1970 was not a national
election year (when voter participation rates are typically
substantially different) this neasure should closely represent
the extent of political interest/activity of the public in
state legislative activity. The source of these data is the
Statistical Abstraet .'of 'the· 'U .. s. 11
Finally, % UNED is neasured by the percent of the
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population over 25 years of age having zero years of educ:ation.
'!he data for this variable care. fran the 1970 u.s. census
of Population. 'Ihis group includes individuals such as
migrant workers, those graving up during the depression who
received no fonnal education, the institutionalized, and any
individual beyond the age o£ 52 who chose to forgo an educa-
tion. 12 Its rranbers are alnost certainly ignorant of legisla-
tive activity as they are likely to be illiterate.13 '!he
rreasure, therefore, closely follCMS the sinple Peltzman hypo-
thesis (and that of Downs) as this entire group is expected
to be ignored by the rational legislator.
It should be noted that this neasure does not account
for any interaction between the legislator and his constituents
(e. g. a legislator using the rredia to "sell" his position
with respect to an issue). Additional analysis of the econanics
of infonnation transmission, especially with respect to the
legislative market, and of an appropriate neasure of the
transmission and its effect on decision making, is likely to
further advance the theol:}' of regulation.
Enpirical Results
'!he PROBIT analysis results for the two capture theoxy
nodels are presented in Tables I and II below. As these
tables show, pararreters for all of the variables except one
are of the appropriate sign. Furthernore, substantial support
is generated for the superiority of the Peltzman nodel.
TABLE I: CAPIURE BY DENTISTS
Dependent Variable
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c=
1 if reciprocity does not exist (= predatory capture)
o othe.rwise (= non-capture)
TEST I: PREDA'IORY MODEL
Explanatory Variable Expected Sign
1) Xl = DENTIST si > 0
2) X = %URBAN ~ > 02
3) X3 = %MOBILE
E 013 ~1
4) X4 = rsIZE
E 0131 <
5) CONSTANT
s
0.036
0.722
-0.182
-0.002
-11.567
t-Ratio
1.37*
0.32
-2.77***
-0.87
-2.52***
Likelihood Ratio Test = 12.90**
Correct Predictions = 68.75%
~ = .2U2
* = Significant at .10
** = Significant at .05
*** = Significant at .01
TABLE II: CAPIURE BY DmrISTS
Dependent Variable
1 if reciprocity does not exist (= predatOl:Y capture)
c=
o otherwise (= non-capture)
TEST II: PELTZMAN M:DEL
"'-
Explanatory Variable Expected Sign a t-Ratio
1) Xl = DENTIST E 0 0.113 2.54***81 >
2) X = %URBAN E 0 .~4. 38 -1.44*2 82 >
3) X3 = %MOBILE
E 0 -0.206 -2.76***8 3 <
4) X4 = lSIZE
E 0 -0.003 -0.7984 <
5) X = VPR E 0 -0.041 1.35*5 85 <
6) X = %UNED E 0 0.731 1.76**6 8 6 >
7) CONSTANT -15.019 -2.70***
Likelihood Ratio Test = 22.67**
Correct Predictions = 81.25%
R2 = .3978
* = Significant at .10
** = Significant at .05
*** = Significant at .01
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In the predato:ry capture nodel two of the four independent
variables are statistically significant. Support is found
for the "voting strength of the capturing group" hypothesis
as the DENrIST coefficient is oorrectly signed and significant
at the .10 level. In addition, the labor nobility variable
is strongly significant, supporting the hypothesis that age
distribution differences affect the desire for nobility and
therefore the dena:nd for reciprocity. rrhe 'Ibllison hypothesis
is only weakly supported here as the LSIZE coefficient is
correct in sign but insignificant. 14 Finally, the % tJRBAN
variable's coefficient, while of the correct sign, is insigni-
ficant in this nodel. A likelihood ratio test was perfo:rned
as a test of the significance of the set of variables together.
'!he test that 81 = f32 = f3 3 :r:; f34 = 0 is rejected at the
.05 level of significance.
In the Peltzman capture rrodel five of the six variables
tested were found to be significant. Of greatest interest
are the two additional "public" variables. Both VPR and
% UNED are appropriately signed and statistically significant.
Hence initial support for Peltzman' s nodel is generated.
A nore conclusive, and nore infonnative test may be
constructed though. rrhe joint test that f3S = f36 = 0, and
therefore that the predatol:Y nodel and not the Peltzrnan nodel
is correct, can be perfonred using the follaving test
. . 16
statistic:
2 [IN~ - INArl where LN\v is the natural log of the
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likelihood functicn for the constrained (predatory) m:x1el
while INA is the natural log of the likelihood ftmetion for
r
the unconstrained (Peltzman) m:x1el.
'!he calculated value of the test statistic (which is
distributed X~) is 9.766 which exceeds' the critical value at
the .01 level of significance. Consequently we may reject the
hypothesis that 85 = 86 = o. The theory of the rational
legislator paying attention to the public as well as the pro-
fessicn is clearly supported. l-hre strongly, we may reject
the hypothesis that the "predatory" nodel is the correct
nodel and that Peltzman' s m:x1el adds nothing new to the analysis.
'!he interpretation of the coefficients must be done
with sate caution as they differ fran OIS coefficients. Re-
call that in 'using PROBIT analysis the original C = F (x) is
transforned into C = G(Z) where Z is an index created as a
linear carbination of the X' s. lm.y pararreter coefficient
which PROBIT generates rreasures the effect of a change
in an independent variable, X., on the index, Z. To find
1
the effect of a change in Xi on the probability of predatory
capture it follows that we must also find the effect of a
change in the index Z on the probability of capture and then
multiply this by 8i' the effect of a change in Xi on Z. As
noted earlier, the effect of a change in Z on the probability
of predatory capture depends upon the value of Z chosen. eon-
ventionally, Z is evaluated at the nean of the X vector.
For exarrple, the 85 = -0.04 for the first (new)
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Pe1tzm:m variable, VPR, does not indicate that a 1 wit change
in VPR leads to a 4 percent change in the probability of pre-
dato:ry capture. Instead 135 = -0.04 indicates that a 1 wit
change in VPR leads to a ·-.04 change in the index Z, created
by PROBIT. With the proper transfonnation \\1e find that a
1 unit increase in VPR, evaluated at the !lEan, results in
a 1.23 percent decrease in the probability of predato:ry capture.
Q1e disturbing result of the errpirical test of Peltzman' s
nodel is the % URBAN variable. 'Ibis variable was designed
to neasure the ease of a:ganization for dentists. '!he PROBIT
results show an incorrect (negative) sign for the % URBAN
coefficient and the variable is significant at the .10 level.
'!his perplexing result nay be dt'e to either of two distinct
reasons. First, between tests I and II two new variables have
been added. Consequently it is possible that an interaction
between VPR and/or %UNED and %URBAN is occurring which is
causing the irrproper 132 sign.
Altematively, the argurrent can be nade that the Peltz-
rran specification is appropriate and the %URBAN variable
encarpasses sore additienal unwanted effects. For exanple, if
the percent of dentists living in urban areas is· correlated
with the percent of the total population living in urban areas,
the ease of coordination of the public (and perhaps the
sophisticaticn of this group as well) may be greater where
. . . wI 17 In% URBAN 1S large. If SO, a negative 132 1S pass e.
any event the initial hypothesis is not supported.
-13-
An overall initial carparison of the two nodels then
suggests that while the "predatOlY" nodel is of sate nerit, the
Peltzman IIDdel , with its additional variables, is preferred.
Quite sirrply, the "predatOlY" capture theolY anits two statis-
tically significant variables. In addition to the individual
significance of each variable added, the likelihood ratio
test for Peltzman •s nodel, testing the hypothesis that 81 = 82
= ••• = 86 = 0, is rejected at an even greater level of signi-
ficance than in the "predatOlY" nodel. '!his as well indicates
the inportance of the two n€!W variables.
'Ihird, the explanatolY pcMer of the two nodels can be
shCMn to differ considerably. '!he neasure of R2 between
cbserved and predicted C's for the Peltzman nodel is nearly
twice that of the "predatOlY" nodel. 'Ihe use of R2 in PROBIT
analysis must be done with caution though, as it has been
dem:nstrated that this neasure is not fully indicative of
the explanatolY pcMer of the nodel.
furrison18 has derronstrated that for bi.nal:y dependent
variable cases, R2 has an upper l:x:nmd which may be oonsiderably
less than unity. His reasoning stems fran the follCMing
equation:
R2 = PREDICTED VAIlJES = -PREDICTED X TRUE
AClUAL 0t.J'.ItXMES TRUE AClUAL
Hence R2 can be seen as being carprised" of two eatp:)1'lents.
'!his being the case, even if a perfect nodel is specified
(and the predicted values exactly match the true values)
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the value of R2 may still fall helCM unity. 'Ibis is so
because the exact distribution of the true probabilities is
unknCMn. Unless it is bi.naJ:y, the second tenn is necessarily
less than unity.
Given that the true probability distribution is unknCM11,
the R2 = .3978 for Peltznan IS nodel does not indicate that
the nodel explains .3978 of the variation in tiC", unless the
true probability distribution is binary. If it is not binary
then the upper bound for R2 is less than unity, and in this
event the R2 neasure can be seen as a ICMer limit of the
explanatory pcwer of the nodel. Given this difficulty with
R2 its usefUlness in PROBIT nodels is limited.
rrhe Explanatory POWerofthe'IWOM:xiels
Fortunately, alternative methods of canparing the
explanatory pc:Mer of the two nodels are available. '!hese
are presented in table III. Fran the PROBIT nodel C = G(Z) ,
a predicted value, C, is generated for each of the observa-
tians (states) in the semple. In table III these predicted
values have been carpiled for both the "predatory" and
Peltzrran IIDde1s. After ranking the predicted values by order
of magnitooe (see table IV) the data has been grouped into
five categories - - fran the "top 10" predicted values to the
"final 8" predicted values. As the highest values are to be
associated with states with the highest likelihood of "preda-
tory" capture, in an accurate nodel we would expect to find
a large percentage of the "top 10" states are in fact
-15-
predatory capture states.19 Table III dem:>nstrates the
perfonnance of the nodels being carpared.
First a "naive" nodel is constructed under the assurrption
that no infonnation as to the magnitude of the observations
for any of the "predatory" or Peltzman independent variables
is available. In this case, given that 32 of the 48 states
are in fact predatory capture states (C. = 1), the naive
1.
nodel would sinply predict that out of 'any group, 32/48 or
66.6% of that group would be capture states. Fran table III
it can be seen that both nodels of regulatory capture are
preferred to the naive nodel. In the "top 10" group, as
predicted by the Peltzman nodel, there is 100% accuracy as
all 10 states are in fact predatory capture states. In
other words, if we are given infomation about the several
variables which Peltzman I s theory deems important, we are
able to choose ten states (the Peltzrnan "top 10") and be
100% accurate, for this sarrple, whereas the naive nodel,
without this infonnation, would randanly choose 10 states
and (on average) be only 66.6% accurate. In carparison
with the naive nodel, then, Peltzman IS nodel here is a clear
inproverrent. Silnilarly, the "top 10" predictions for the
predatory nodel do equally well.
A carparison of the Peltzrnan and predatory nodels for the
four other groups, though, dennnstrates that the Peltzman
nodel is preferred. In the "2nd 10" group, 90% of the Peltzman
states are in fact capture states while 80% of the predatory
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TABLE III: EXPIANAIDRY POOER OF THE M:>DE!.S:
DENTISTRY S'IUDY
Naive Predato:ry Peltzman
Peltzman
Constrained
'Ibp 10 66.6% predatory 100% predatory 100% predato:ry 100% predato:ry
capture capture capture capture
2nd 10 66.6%
3rd 10 66.6%
4th 10 66.6%
Final 8 66.6%
80%
40%
70%
37.5%
90%
80%
30%
25%
100%
50%
40%
37.5%
% Correct
Predictions
'Ibp 32
Rank
Correlation
r=
68. 75% correct
75% capture
81.25% correct 79.16% correct
87.5% capture 81.25% capture
.7975 .8340
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TABLE IV
PREDICTED AND OBSERVED VAI1JES OF C: DENTISTRY
Predatory M:x3el Peltzman M:>del Peltzman Constrained M:Xlel
A A A
C. C. c. C. c. C.l. l. ~ 1- 1- ~
1) .999 1 .999 1 .999 I"
2) .996 1 .999 1 ".999 1
3) .996 1 .998 1 .998 1
4) .981 1 .984 1 .993 1
5) .960 1 .981 1 .992 1
6) .956 1 .976 1 .975 1
7) .953 1 .973 1 .965 1
8) .950 1 100% .972 1 100% .963 1 100%
9) .948 1 predatory .962 1 predatory .958 1 predatory
10) .922 1 capture .959 1 capture .958 1 capture
11) .909 1 .956 1 .958 1
12) .873 1 .956 1 .940 1
13) .850 1 .948 1 .893 1
14) .813 1 .940 1 .892 1
15) .799 1 .937 1 .887 1
16) .798 1 .922 1 .886 1
17) .787 1 .902 1 .885 1
18) .777 0 80% .894 1 90% .882 1 100%
19) .766 0 predatory .879 0 predatory .875 1 predatory
20) .751 1 capt-qre .879 1 capture .856 1 capture
21) .747 0 .877 1 .845 1
22) .733 1 .841 1 .772 1
23) .727 0 .798 1 .765 1
24) .717 1 .777 0 .749 1
25) .686 1 .730 1 .734 0
26) .685 0 .727 1 .734 0
27) .633 0 .691 0 .730 0
28) .630 1 40% .680 1 80% .713 1 50%
29) .606 0 predato:ry .635 1 predatory .704 o predatory
30) .600 0 capture .628 1 capture .684 0 capture
31) .599 1 .594 0 .679 1
32) .588 1 .593 1 .602 0
33) .566 1 .593 0 .589 1
34) .533 1 .532 0 .517 1
35) .515 0 .504 1 .467 0
36) .503 1 .474 0 .452 0
37) .501 0 .414 0 .419 0
38) .486 1 70% .304 0 30% .358 0 40%
39) .482 1 predato:ry .290 1 predatory .341 1 predatoIY
40) .469 0 capture .285 0 ca ure .316 0 ca ure
41 .444 1 .222 0 .245 1
42) .421 0 .211 1 .243 0
43) .321 1 .178 0 .230 1
44) .287 1 .175 1 .219 0
45) .235 0 .139 0 .212 1
46) .217 0 37.5% .133 0 25% .114 0 37.5%
47 .178 o predatory .117 0 predatory .054 0 predatol:Y
48) .164 0 capture .018 0 capture .041 0 capture
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"2nd 10" group are capture states. In the "3rd 10" group,
80% of Peltzman' s states are capture states while cnly 40~
of the predatory "3rd 10" group are capture states. rrhe
superior perfo:rnance of the Peltzman rrodel in the final two
groups (where, it turns out, non-capture is widely predicted
as rrost C· s are C < .5) is also derronstrated as in both
cases the Peltznan rrodel predicts less captures than the
predatory nodel and the naive nodel. An especially troubling
result for the predatory nodel lies in the "4th 10" group,
where fully 70% of the states in this group were predicted to
be capture states.
Two sunmary statistics are also included in table III.
'!he first is the correct predictions rate. Here, a prediction
is accepted as being correct if C > .5 is observed in a state
where predatory capture (C = 1) is in fact the case, or if
C < .5 is observed in a non-capture (C = 0) state. Using
this sunmary rreasure the Peltzrran rrodel maintained an 81.25%
correct predictions rate. The predatory nodel' s correct
predicticns rate was 68.75%. '!bus the "predatory" nodel is
cnIy slightly better than the naive nodel (66.6% correct)
while the Peltzrran nodel clearly daninates both.
As a second sunmary statistic, if we focus on the top
32 predicted values for each nodel (since there are 32 capture
states) we see that the Peltzrran nodel is again superior.
W:U.le 75% of the "predatory" "top 32" are in fact capture
states, fully 87.5% of the Peltzman "top 32" are capture states.
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As a final nethcx:l of conparing the two m:xlels, a rank
oorrelation coefficient, r, is calculated using a ranking of
A
the states according to the predicted C. I S fran the
~
20Peltzman and Predat0l:Y rrodels (p. 17 above). '!he r = +. 7975
derronstrates that the two rankings are positively correlated.
In addition, the null hypothesis that the rankings are inde-
pendent is rejected at the .01 level. Given this, the
rreasure appears to be in cooflict with the remaining statisti-
cal results. In part this is true, yet the rank correlation
measure only indicates that the rankings are correlated.
'Ihe remaining tests (al:x:>ve) are nore detailed indicators of
the accuracy of each ranking. Thus, although the ranking of
the Peltzman and Predat0l:Y nodels are positively related to
one another the Peltzman nodel remains nore accurate.
Finally, as the Peltzman nodel has one argurrent, % tJRBAN,
with an inappropriately signed coefficient (62 < 0) the nodel
was retested with 62 constrained to 62 = O. r:rhe final colurm
in table III ("Peltzman constrained") reports the results for
this nodel. In this final version, in both the "top 10"
and "2nd 10" groups, 100% of the states are in fact capture
states, an inprovercent over the unconstrained nodel, but the
, surmary statistics of the full Peltzman nodel are slightly
better. '!he conparison bet\Veen the two llDdels (Peltzman and
predatOl:Y) though, is not substantially changed. In sum,
the predatOl:Y nodel is ~. mild irrprovement over the naive rrodel.
'!he Peltzrran rrodel is clearly superior to both.
-20-
c. ) ·~cnetl:y ·Results
Dataand~suremerttoftheVariables
In the second case study I seek to explain the existing
pattern of regulation over price advertising in the retail
sector of the prescription eyeglasses industry. '!he dependent
variable is again binal:y. States are defined as predato~
capture states if opticians are not allCMed to price advertise
or non-capture states if opticians are allowed to price adv-er-
tise, '!he infonnation concerning these advertising regulations
c:x:nES fran a search of the 1970 optaretry laws of the various
states . Forty-five states are examined. 21
In this study the inpact of a number of interest groups
is examined. '!he professionals, optaretrists, whcm Benham
claims have captured the regulations are rreasured first with
the variable OPlMPOP, which is a rreasure of the per capita
number of optcrcetrists in each state. rrhe source for these
data was an B.E.w. report on selected health occupations. 22
secondly, their organizational abilities, UROOPIM%, is rreasured
as in the first study.
'!he first opposition group variable, OPICPOP, is a neasure
of the per.capita number of opticians working in either camer-
cial finns or d.epart::m=nt stores in a state. '!he data here
are fran a similar B.E.W. report. 23 Finally, the AGENPOP
variable is a neasure of the per capita nurrber of enployees in
advertising agencies in each state. '!hese data care from the
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1970 u.s. Census publication~ 'Cbtirtty 'BUSiness 'Patterns. The
definitions and sources of data for the remaining variables
(LSIZE, VPR, and % UNED) are the same as in the dentistry study.
DnpiricalResults
The PIDBIT analysis results for the two ce:rrpeting capture
theory IOOdels are presented in tables V and VI below. As
these tables shCM, parameters for all of the variables except
one, AGENPOP, are of the appropriate sign. In the predatory
capture nodel, though, none of the variables tested is signifi-
cant at the; .10 level of significance• Only the organizational
variable, UROOPIM%, is close, being significant at the .15
level. Furthern:ore, the likelihood ratio test that
Sl = S2 = S3 = 0 can not be rejected even at the .50 level.
Further evidence of the weakness of this nodel is derronstrated
in the R2 = .0382 value.
In sharp contrast, several of the variables in the
1 ~ 1 " 11 "f' 24 I thPe tzman Ul..JUe are statistica y S1.gIll 1.cant. n e
oolumn labeled "Peltzman #1" we see that four of the seven
variables tested are significant. First, OPIQ>OP, the xooasure
of optician opposition is correctly signed and significant
at the .10 level. Using the appropriate transfonnation (as
described above) the value 83 = 0.224 may be interpreted as
indicating that a 1 uni.t increase in OPIQ>OP, evaluated at the
mean, lowers the likelihood of capture by 8.6%.
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TABLE V: CAP'IURE BY OPrrMETRISTS
Dependent Variable
1 if opticians are not all~ to price advertise (non-capture)
y=
o bthelWise (non-capture)
Explanatory Variable
1) Xl = OPIMPQP
2) X = URBOP'IM%2 ,
3) X3 = LSIZE
TEST I: PREDA'roRY IDDEL
'"
'Expected 'Sign 'S t~Ratio
BE > 0 0.005 0.0881
BE > 0 2.551 1.258+2
SE < 0 -0.001 -0.4983
4) CONSTANT
Likelihood Ratio Test = 1.88
Correct Predictioo = 55.5%
2 _
R - 0.0382
* = Significant at .10
+ = Significant at .15
-1.799 -0.982
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TABLE VI: CAP'IURE BY OPICMErRISTS
Dependent Variable
1 if opticians are not allowed to price advertise
y= (predatory capture)
0 otherwise (non-capture )
TEST II: PELTZMAN M:DELS
Peltzman #1 Peltzman #2
A A
Explanatory Variable ~ed Sign S t-Ratio S t-Ratio
1) Xl = OPIMPOP SE > 0 0.154 1.36* 0.158 1.40*1
2) X2 = URBOP'IM% SE > 0 0.742 0.29 0.509 0.192
3) X3 = LSIZE SE < 0 -0.003 -1.111 -0.004 -1.173
4) X4 = OPIO?OP SE < 0 -0.224 -1.61* -0.194 -1.30*4
5) X = VPR SE < 0 -0.034 -1.04 -0.033 -0.985 5
6) X = %UNED SE > 0 0.694 1.79** 0.717 1.84**6 6
7) X = AGENPOP SE < 0 0.038 1.64* 0.026 0.797 7
8) X = INTER SE > 0 0.0001 0.518 8
9) X9 = COOSTAN!' -0.627 -0.24 -0.467 -0.81
Likelihood Ratio Test =
Correct Predictions =
R
2
=
* = Significant at .10
** = Significant at .05
14.19**
71.11%
.2606
14.50*
68.88%
.2689
Second, the "legislator ignores the uninfonred voter"
hypothesis is once again strongly supported as %UNED is
significant at the .05 level. 'Ibird, the "predatory capture"
variable, OPlMPOP, here becares significant. r.rhe irrproved
status of this variable over its insignificant level in the
predatory nodel again is indicative of the superiority of
the Peltzman nodel. If the capture theory in any fonn is of
nerit, we expect OPlMPOP to be an inportant variable. Its
sw:prising lack of significance in the predatOIY nodel may
well be a result of a mis-specification bias due to the anission
of the several additional variables needed in a properly
specified (Peltzman) nodel.
'Ib COlPlete the carparison of the predatOIY and Peltznan
nodels' variables and to derronstrate the superiority of the
latter m:x:lel' s specification one additional test is perforned.
Using the test statistic described earlier, the hypothesis that
64 = S5 = S6 = 67 = 0 is tested. The test statistic's
value is 7.84 which exceeds the critical value at the .05
level of significance and therefore the above hypothesis is
rejected. In other words the hypothesis that the additional
Pe1tzman variables are as a group insignificant and add
nothing to the predatoIY nodel is rejected. 'Ibis canbined with
the favorable 1ikelihcxXl ratio test resuJ_t..~ for the Peltzrran
nodel (the hypothesis that 61 = 62 =•••=67 = 0 is also rejected)
and the unfavorable result for the predatory nodel for the
same test generates conclusive support for the superiority of
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the Peltznan m:x1el in the study at hand.
Finally, the seventh variable, AGENPOP, is disappointing
as it is inproperly signed and significant. '!he variable,
neasuring the per capita nurrber of errployees in advertising
agencies was expected to shCM the voting strength, and
therefore opposition by this group, to advertising restrictions.
'!he difficulty with AGENPOP is that it is weak rreasure of the
true interest group and its influence. A primary problem is
that of diverging interests arrong advertising agencies. '!he
agencies nost interested in the relatively srcall, lccal
acCOtmts would nost likely be the smaller lccal finns. For
these finns often the snall advertising carrpaigns are their
major source of revenues. Many of the largest advertising
agencies, though, focus solely or largely on interstate,
national or international aCCOtmts. In states (New York,
Illinois, etc.) where this occurs the AGENPOP value is veJ:Y
high while interest in the na.rrcM issue of advertising by
opticians may be quite ICM. Unforttmately, data concerning
enployIre11.t in small advertising agencies alone is not available
due to disclosure laws. 'Ib the extent that large advertising
agencies (or any agencies that deal principally in out-of-state
activities) daninate the neasure of AGENPOP, then, the rreasure' s
accuracy is diminished.
'lb derronstrate the problem with AGENPOP a seccnd m:x1el is
tested (Peltzrran #2) in which an interaction tenn is entered.
In particular, the nEM tenn INrER is defined sinply as
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(AGENPQP) • (POP). '!he new INI'ER tenn uses POP (state
PJpulaticn) for several reasons. First, the size and number
of large (and therefore disinterested) advertising agencies is
closely correlated with the rreasure of state population.
Secondly, the nore heavily populated states tend to coincide
with the greatest number of advertising agencies which deal
with interstate or international accounts or agencies created
to service one account. 25 rrhird, POP also helps to derronstrate
that in the IIDst heavily populated areas the number of ad
agency enployees is larger than the number of potential votes
in a state as errployees may live in adjacent states (again,
New York and Illinois are primary exanples.)
In the Peltzman #2 nodel the new derivative
~7 = B7 + B8 · POP. '!he positive value of B8 indicates
tha ae . ed' tha ~ . high' wheret aX ~s overstat m t 1J7 ~s er m states
7
pop (and therefore less interest in regulation than AGENPOP
suggests) is high. '!his test does not by itself dem:nstrate
that f37 < 0 (as the Peltzrran nodel ~uld predict) but that
.AGENPOP is inaccurate and a IIDre accurate neasure may result
ExplanatolY ·PcMerof the'ThJO ~ls
In tables VII and VIII a carparisan of the explanatory
paEr of the nodels is presented for optaretry. '!he naive
nodel is constructed under the assunpticn that no information
as t.o the magnitude of any of the predatory or Peltzrnan
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variables is available. Here, as 25 of the states are in fact
capture states the naive nodel would predict that 25/45 or 55.5%
of any group of states would in fact be capture states.
Fran the table we can first of all see the~ perfor-
mance of the predatory nodel. Of the "top 10" group, 80%
are correctly predicted as capture states. For the "2nd 10"
group, though, which should be heavily dominated by capture
states as well, only 20% are in fact capture states. At
the other end of the spectrum, in the "final 5" categol:Y
which should have no capture states at all, 40% of the states
are captured. 'Ihe overall perfonnance of the nodel, as seen
in the surrma.ry statistics, is also poor. First, only 60%
of the "top 25" states are in fact capture states. fltbre
i.np:>rtant, though, is that only 55.5% of all states were
correctly predicted. Consequently, the predatol:Y nodel,
according to the latter neasure, does no better at all than
the naive nodel.
'!he perfonnance of the Peltzman (il) nodel is again
substantially better. 26 Of the "top 10" group, 90% are
capture states while 60% of the states in the "2nd 10" group
are capture states. Furthenrore, in the "final 5" category
a sharp ilTproverrent over the predatOIY nodel is seen in that
none of these states (for Peltzman) are captured. Again
perhaps the clearest evidence of the superior performance of
the Peltzman nodel lies in the two surrma.ry statistics.
First, of the "top 25" group, 72% of the states are capture
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TABLE VII: EXPIANA'IORY PCWER OF THE K>DELS
OPIG1EIRY S'IUDY
Peltzman
Naive PredatO:r:y Peltzman Constrained
'Ibp 10 55.5% predatory 80% predatory 90% predatory 70% predatory
capture capture capture capture
2nd 10 55.5%
3rd 10 55.5%
4th 10 55.5%
Final 5 55.5%
20%
90%
40%
40%
60%
60%
40%
0%
70%
70%
40%
0%
%Correct
Predictions 55.5% correct 71.11%correct 75.5% correct
'Ibp 25 60% capture 72% capture 72% capture
Rank r=
Correlation .
.4188 .4220
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TABLE VIII
PREDIcrED AND OBSERVED VAI1JES OF C: O:P'.rGffiTRy
Predatory M:xie1 Pe1tzman ~1 Peltzman Constrained r-t:xle1
A
"
A
C. C. C. C. C. C.J. J. J. J. J. J.
1) .763 1 1.00 1 .980 1
2) .745 1 .996 1 .892 1
3) .698 0 .990 1 .874 1
4) .693 1 .921 1 .874 0
5) .688 0 .918 1 .870 0
6) .687 1 .885 1 .828 1
7) .683 1 .855 1 .802 1
8) .643 1 80% .851 1 90% .802 1 70%
9) .641 1 predatory .843 0 predato:ry .721 1 predatory
10) .616 1 capture .809 1 .capture .721 0 capture
11) .615 0 .797 0 .719 1
12) .610 0 .771 0 .713 1
13) .608 0 .707 1 .690 1
14) .607 0 .700 1 .679 1
15) .605 0 .678 1 .673 1
16) .605 1 .658 1 .647 0
17) .602 1 .645 1 .628 1
18) .590 0 20% .643 0 60% .619 0 70%
19) .569 0 predatory .590 1 predatory .611 1 predatory
20) .565 0 capture .574 0 capture .609 0 capture
21) .564 1 .576 0 .579 1
22) .560 1 .548 1 .567 1
23) .558 1 .547 1 .559 0
24) .552 1 .546 1 .554 1
25) .544 1 .535 0 .529 1
26) .537 1 .500 1 .517 1
27) .530 1 .488 0 .511 1
28) .529 1 90% .484 1 60% .505 1 70%
29) .527 1 predatory .469 1 predato:ry .487 0 predato:ry
30) .525 0 capture .465 0 capture .482 0 capture
31) .523 0 .416 1 .464 0
32) .514 0 .381 1 .448 1
33) .506 0 .374 0 .424 1
34) .491 0 .356 0 .379 0
35) .488 1 .353 1 .355 0
36) .485 1 .340 0 .353 1
37) .478 1 .315 0 .344 1
38) .449 0 40% .309 1 40% .295 0 40%
39) .448 1 predatory .194 0 predatory .287 0 predato:ry
. ·40)
.446 0 capture .190 0 .capture .244 0 capture
41) .431 0 .164 0 .240 0
42) .423 1 .156 0 .211 0
43) .415 1 40% .095 0 0% .155 0 0%
44) .398 0 predatory .092 0 predatory .136 0 predato:ry
45) .21.3 0 capture .044 0 capture .106 0 capture
,
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states. Seccndly, the Peltzman nodel correctly predicts
71.1% of all states, which is 15% nore states correctly
predicted than either the predatory or naive nodel.
Finally, cnce again a rank correlation coefficient is
calculated fran the C. •s in the two nodels. Here the value
~
r = +.4220 dem:nstrates a much weaker positive correlation
between the predatory and Peltzman (constrained) nodels'
rankings than was the case for the dentistry study. 27
~e final colum, "Peltzman constrained," is the Peltz-
nan nodel with the (inappropriately signed) AGENPOP variable
constrained such that 67 = o. '!he weaker perfonnance of
this nodel in the "top 10" group is disappointing (and shavs
the need for an advertising agency variable), yet the per-
\
fonnance within the top two groups carbined ("top 10" plus
"2nd 10") is an inprovenent over the predatory nodel. ~e
"final 5" category for the Peltzman constrained nodel
(0% captured) is also a sharp inprovenent over the predatory
nodel. Finally, the constrained nodel' s prediction rate,
75.5%, is in fact higher than that of the unconstrained nodel,
while the "top 25" surnnary statistic did not change between
the two Peltzman nodels.
In sum, in case study #2, the lack of statistical
significance of the predatory nodel' s variables, c:xxrbined
with the significance of several of the Peltzman variables,
again leads to the conclusion that the Peltzman nodel is to
be preferred to the predatory nodel. In addition the
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explanato:ry pcMer of the predato:ry nodel (as seen in the
prediction rate rreasure) is no better than that of the naive
nndel, while the Peltzman nodel (5) are able to predict
15-20% nore of the states correctly.
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FootnoteS for Chapter III
1 Here the X variable, as presented in Chapter I (p. 25),
has been partitioned into two groups.
2 '!he analysis which follcws stems fran an econaretrics text.
by D. Rubinfeld and R. Pindyck entitled Econmetric Models and
Econanic Forecasts, ~raw-Hill Inc., New York, 1976.
3
'!he nore general form C = F (X) is used in this section for
silrplicity.
4 Rubinfeld, P. 234-241.
5 Another transfonnaticn using the cumulative logistic
probability function generates a I..£X;IT rrodel which has similar
properties.
6 G. Judge, R. Hill, W. Griffiths, H. Lutkepohl and
J. Lee , Introducticntothe'IheoryandPractice .of Econooetrics,
John Wiley and Sans, 1982. P. 517-22.
7 Shepard' s list (source unknCMn) matches the A.D.A. source for
each of the 45 states he exarni.ried. As the A.D.A. publication
lists 16 reciprocity states though (Shepard clained 15) apparently
the two disagree on one of the five remaining states which Shepard
left out. As it is irrpossib1e to disceDl which state differed,
one additional test was run deleting all five sotes. '!he results
did not differ fran those reported here, which use the A.D.A.
source.
8 SCIre data (% MOBILE) were unavailable for califoDlia and
Alabama and therefore these two 'states were deleted.
9 u.s. Dept. of Health, Education and velfare, Decennial
Census Data for selected Health cecupations~u.s. 1970.
10 u. s. Dept. of Health Educaticn and welfare, Public Health
service, National Health Institute, CCIrIpilation of .State Dentist
Manpower Reports, 1970.
11 f ~~ Burea f th cen Statiosti'calu.s. Dept. 0 '-"Alllcrce, U 0 e sus,
Abstract of the U.S. 1972.. p. 375.
12 CCIrIpu1sory education began in 1918 nationally. Therefore any-
one above the age of 52 had the Opportl-m.ty to (legally) choose to
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avoid public education.
13 The correlation between %UNED and % illiterate is r = .926.
Hence the use of the present (%UNED) measure seans reasonable.
14 The Snith variable~ per °capita size of the legislature, was
also tested. This hypothesis was even less substantiated. The
appropriate (negative) sign was found for the coefficient but a
t = .05 resulted. The" rest of the m:::xiel's results renained unchanged.
15 The values of the coefficients Sl and S are reasonable in
c:x:rcparison with those values found in the previ6us literature by
Stigler, SUi.th, and Tollison who tested similar variables.
16 Judge et. al., p. 524-25.
17 '!'hi ' ed b 11" '1s argunent ].s suggest ¥ To 1son m a recent Journa
article. See R. Tollison, and W. Crain, "Constitutional Change
in an Interest Group Perspective," °Jolitrtal Oaf °Legal °Studies. January
1979.
18 D. Morrison, "Upper Bounds for Correlations Between Binary
OUtcanes and Probabilistic Functions, II °Jotitlia1 Oaf °the Arrerican
Statistical Association, March 1972.
19 Thus the percentage of predatory capture states should fall
as we nove fran group #1 to group #5.
20 The technique used to calculate r is described in many
introductory statistics texts. See, for example, J. WelkON'itz ,
R. EWen, and J. Cohen ~ °IntrOductory °Statistics °for °the °BehaVioral
Sciences, New York: AcadEmic Press, 1971, p. 175-78.
21 For five states it was inpossible to define the state as
capture or non-capture. For example, in Texas, while price adver-
tising is allowed, several conditions must be met for those who
wish to do so. Connecticut, Ohio, Arkansas, and N. Dakota are
anitted for silnilar reasons.
22 "Decermial Census Data••• , II p. 55.
23 Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare, Opticians
Enployedin °Health °services: ·U~S. "1969.
24 For the X and X variables, the coefficient values in this
study are again ~nsis~twith previous anpirical work by Stigler,
9nith, and Tollison.
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25 In states such as Michigan and Pennsylvania a large portion
of the AGENPOP measure nay be those working for one (auto manu-
facturing) account.
26 '!he Peltzman #2 nodel, with INTER, was designed solely to
denonstrate the expected weakness of the AGENPOP variable. It
is therefore inappropriate to use #2 to neasure the predictive
po.ver of "Peltzman' s" rrodel. In any event, the results of #2
(not ShCM11 here) are similar to the Peltzman #1 results.
27 Q1ce again, though, the null hypothesis that the tvJo
rankings are independent is rejected (here at the .05 level of
significance) • 'Ihis is further evidence of the weakness of this
neasure since in this study, fully 20 of the 45 states as ranked
by the Peltzmannodel were at least 10 (and in 1 case 38) positions
higher or lower than the rank given by the Predatory nodel.
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A.) StlITIllarY and COnclusions ·of·thePresent Study
'!his study has dealt with a nurrber of di.m:msians concerning
the theol:Y of regulatol:Y capture. It has presented a smmary
of previous literature, first denonstrating the similarities
and differences of the various works presented over the
past two decades, and then classifying these works into one of
three categories ~ 1) capture hypothesis, 2) predatol:Y capture,
or 3) Peltzman capture.
Of much greater i.Irportance, this work provides an errpiri-
cally testable nodel of the Peltzman capture theol:Y. Several
features of this nodel are of particular i.Irportance. First,
the nodel is general in that it can be applied to several
case studies. In each of the two cases examined, the sensi-
tivity of the legislator to the demands and influences of the
interest groups have been neasured using the sane variables.
'!hese variables (voting strength, % UNED, VPR, etc.) can
be used in a variety of other studies as well.
secood, the variables used directly neasure the strength
of the different interest groups by neasuring their political
IXJWer, rather than sinply neasuring the strength of their
interest in an issue. 'Ibis is an advantage over previous
studies (i. e. Oster) since interest by a group in an issue
is a neces5al:Y cxndition for legislative action, but not a
sufficient condition. As well as shCMing an interest in a
particular piece of legislation, the group nn.1St also derronstrate
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that it is able to affect the likelihood of election of the
legislator.
Third, the nodel developed is general in that it enccm-
passes the simpler predatory nodel and thus can be (and has
been) used in a direct CCIrq?arison with that simpler nodel. This
third feature is largely a result of the fact that the Peltz-
man theory is a general theory, but the specific applied
no:1el presented allaYS for the canparison with the predatory
no:1el to be made.
The results of the anpirical work in Chapter III above
support several conclusions. First, the evidence fran both
case studies supports the Peltzman theory of regulation. Nearly
all of the variables tested in the two cases supported the
hypotheses arising fran the theory, and many of the variables
tested were statistically significant. Second, the evidence
supports the conclusion that the Peltzman theory is preferred
to that of the sinpler predatory theory of regulatory capture.
Although the rankings of the two nroels could not be shown
as being independent, the evidence in the t\\1o case studies
has denonstrated that the Peltzman nodel's rankings are nnre
,
accurate, resulting in nnre accurate explanations of the
existing state of regulation.
A third oonclusion which can be drawn is that in these
two cases (and especially the dentistry case) the public's
interest can be, and is maintained in many states. This
conclusion is contrary to the beliefs maintained by the
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predatory capture proponents. M:>reover, the Pelt:zman theory
now presents an explanation as to why the public interest is
in sane cases protected, even when it is in direct conflict
with the interests of an industry or professional group. What
the evidence suggests is that it is not necessarily the benev-
olence of the legislator which yields this result. To the
contrary, it is the self-interests of the legislator (i. e.
political support maximization), and the incentive to protect
those self-interests, which leads to this result--in particular,
when the public's awareness and voting participation are high.
B.) Areas for Future Research
The dissertation suggests a number of interesting questions
for additional research. First, as mentioned in Chapter III,
a closer study of the interaction of the legislator and the
interest groups, in particular with respect to infonnation
dissemination, may further clarify the process of reg-
ulatory capture. Specific questions of interest concern
1) the use of the media, either by an interest group or
a legislator trying to influence a group, and 2) the
influence of this infonna.tion flow, both on voting groups
and legislators.
Second, the question of the effect of non-vote support
(can:prign aid) is a potential topic for further study
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in the future. Until recently the level of campaign contribu-
tions by an interest group was private information. Given
the new campaign contribution disclosure laws, future studies
of regulatory capture occurring in the 1980's will be able to
investigate the effect of campaign dollar support by a group
on the likelihood of capture.
Finally, the focus of this and other work pertaining to
regulatory capture has been one of explaining why or when
capture occurs. Yet, recently there has been a IIDVerent toward
deregulation. AIthough rrost noticeable at the federal level,
this activity has also occurred in nurrerous industries/pro-
fessions at the state level as well. A logical follow-up
question to that of why capture occurs is that ·of why capture
dissolves in different states and at different t.iIres. One
might expect to find that the same variables (or a subset
thereof) as those presented in the present studies again play
an important role. On othe other hand, additional and/or
different variables may be important in these cases.
Clearly, substantial additional research is needed to
resolve these and other questions. The initial empirical
evidence generated here supports the nost recent theory of
regulatory capture, and suggests that the theory is substan-
tially correct. Further evidence which deronstrates that
the theory holds in numerous alternative settings is necessary.
The present study offers a m:x:1el with which this additional
research can be un.der-~en.
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